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1 1 (December 2017)

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Key  Points

  *  Russia's past aggression toward states along its periphery calls into question what
     action it might take against Estonia.
  *  This report considers three possible scenarios for military intervention against Estonia in
     decreasing order of scale: a full-scale military offensive, a limited land grab, and an
     ongoing campaign   of subversion with no intent to take or hold territory.
  *  Continuing prioritization of military and civil resilience for Estonia is both prudent and a
     sound investment of local and NATO resources.


The Western  view of nations bordering Russia as
independent  sovereign states with the right to
determine  their own foreign policy conflicts with
Russia's view that it must maintain a sphere of
influence, including controlling the foreign policy
orientation of its neighbors to ensure its own national
security. Russia views armed conflict as one of the
most likely ways to resolve this contradiction. After
Russia's military interventions in Georgia, Ukraine,
and Syria, alarming scenarios for Moscow launching
aggression of one form or another in states along
Russia's western periphery are now commonplace.
   This analysis presents three possible scenarios
for military intervention against Estonia in decreasing
order of scale: a full-scale military offensive, a limited
land grab, and finally, an ongoing campaign of
subversion with no intent to take or hold territory.
   The scenarios described in this chapter are unlikely
in the short term. Yet none of them can be completely
ruled out-Russia's opaque decision-making process,
its habitual misunderstanding of the rest of the world,
and its inclination to see military adventurism as


a reliable means of resolving foreign policy challenges
mean  that Estonia must be prepared for the worst.

Preparing for Conflict

The question of whether Russia may launch a military
intervention against Estonia is not one of capabilities,
which in Russia's case are more than adequate. Instead,
it is of the risk-benefit calculation for Moscow. This
calculation, in turn, is to a decisive degree shaped
by Moscow's  perception of the domestic and
international security context in which Estonia finds
itself, as well as Russia's assessment of its own military
strength in the region.
   For almost a decade, Russia has been engaged in
a defense reorganization and rearmament program
of unprecedented depth and cost., For Russia's Baltic
neighbors, forces available locally and immediately
to Russia to conduct operations across the whole
spectrum  of military activities vastly outmatch
friendly forces present in the region.
   Estonia maintains two ground  forces brigades:
the 1st Infantry Brigade constituting the defense


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