HeinOnline is a subscription-based resource containing thousands of academic and legal journals from inception; complete coverage of government documents such as U.S. Statutes at Large, U.S. Code, Federal Register, Code of Federal Regulations, U.S. Reports, and much more. Documents are image-based, fully searchable PDFs with the authority of print combined with the accessibility of a user-friendly and powerful database. For more information, request a quote or trial for your organization below.
![handle is hein.amenin/aeiaahz0001 and id is 1 raw text is:
Key Points
* All three Baltic States have been consistently targeted by Moscow's compatriot
policies, information warfare, and various forms of military intimidation.
* There is an ever-present risk that Russia will try to use the Baltic States' sizable ethnic
Russian and Russian-speaking minority to advance its foreign policy and potentially
even territorial ambitions by subverting local governance and exacerbating internal
political and social rifts.
* Estonia and its allies would do well to deter and prepare for Russia's hard offenses
while mitigating and neutralizing its softer efforts at destabilization.
Since the 1990s and particularly since Russia's
annexation of Crimea in March 2014, all three
Baltic States have been consistently targeted by
Moscow's compatriot policies, information warfare,
and various forms of military intimidation. Estonia's
vulnerabilities and fissures vis-fi-vis potential Russian
aggression can be assessed through four categories
of analysis: (1) social and ethnic tensions stemming
from the presence of its Russian-speaking minority,
(2) the risks emanating from the country's domestic
political environment, (3) economic and energy
liabilities, and (4) its exposure to broader geostrategic
and security threats.
Moscow's view of the Baltic States is complex.
On the one hand, it views them as part of its sphere
of influence, despite their NATO and EU membership.
For instance, in 2oo8 President Dmitry Medvedev
asserted Russia's right to privileged interests in
its neighboring states and certainly the regions
bordering [Russia].' On the other hand, Estonia,
Latvia, and Lithuania are treated distinctly by Russia
compared to former member states of the Soviet
Union because the West never recognized their
annexation by the Soviet Union and because since
reestablishing independence in 1991 they have carved
out their own geopolitical destiny by joining the EU
and NATO in 2004.
Yet unlike other new EU and NATO members,
the Baltic States are vulnerable to Russia's policies
of compatriot protection because of their sizable
ethnic Russian and Russian-speaking minority, residing
mostly in areas bordering the Russian Federation.
As I have recently argued,2 there is an ever-present
risk that Russia will try to use this minority to advance
its foreign policy and potentially even territorial
ambitions by subverting local governance and
exacerbating internal political and social rifts.3
The Russian Minority
What Moscow refers to as its compatriots
residing in neighboring states are a mixed group
that includes Russian speakers who are often-
but not always-ethnic Russians, who will be
AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE](ViewImageLocal?handle=hein.amenin/aeiaahz0001&div=1&collection=&method=preview&ext=.png&size=3)