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Case Citations [1] (July 2019 - April 2020)

handle is hein.ali/relwprpty0258 and id is 1 raw text is: 





                                      PROPERTY



                                DIVISION   3. FUTURE   INTERESTS

                                    PART   4. SPECIAL   TOPICS

                           CHAPTER 25. POWERS OF APPOINTMENT

                                     TOPIC   1. DEFINITIONS

  § 318. Definition-Power  of Appointment

  W.D.Tex.Bkrtcy.Ct.2019.  Subsec. (1) and com. (2) cit. in case cit. in sup.; illus. 1 quot. in sup. In
  Chapter 7 proceedings, trustee objected to, among other things, debtor's claim of a homestead
  exemption in a house that he and his wife had purchased in their individual capacities and later
  transferred to a living trust. After a bench trial, this court sustained trustee's objections in part, holding
  that the house lost its homestead-exemption protections when it was transferred to the trust, because the
  trust was not a qualified trust under the property code. The court rejected debtor's argument that the
  trust was qualified because it provided that he or wife, as settlors or beneficiaries of the trust, had the
  right to exercise an inter vivos general power of appointment over the house within the meaning of
  Restatement of Property §§ 318 and 319, noting that the provision of the trust relied on by debtor merely
  allowed debtor or wife to remove the house from the trust, and did not give them the right to alter the
  disposition of the house or create interests in the house in any appointees. In re Cyr, 605 B.R. 784, 803.

  § 319. Definitions-Donor, Donee,  Objects, Appointees, Takers in Default, Property Covered by a
  Power, Owned   Interest

  W.D.Tex.Bkrtcy.Ct.2019.  Com.  (f) cit. in sup. In Chapter 7 proceedings, trustee objected to, among
  other things, debtor's claim of a homestead exemption in a house that he and his wife had purchased in
  their individual capacities and later transferred to a living trust. After a bench trial, this court sustained
  trustee's objections in part, holding that the house lost its homestead-exemption protections when it was
  transferred to the trust, because the trust was not a qualified trust under the property code. The court
  rejected debtor's argument that the trust was qualified because it provided that he or wife, as settlors or
  beneficiaries of the trust, had the right to exercise an inter vivos general power of appointment over the
  house within the meaning of Restatement of Property §§ 318 and 319, noting that the provision of the
  trust relied on by debtor merely allowed debtor or wife to remove the house from the trust, and did not
  give them the right to alter the disposition of the house or create interests in the house in any appointees.
  In re Cyr, 605 B.R. 784, 803.



                                TOPIC  2. CREATION OF POWERS

  § 323. Intent to Create a Power


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.1 owIm--   For earlier citations, see the Appendices, Supplements, or Pocket Parts, if any, that correspond to the subject matter under examination.

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