Testing the Assumptions Underlying the Debate about Scientific Evidence: A Closer Look at Juror Incompetence and Scientific Objectivity
![handle is hein.journals/conlr25 and id is 1099 raw text is: TESTING THE ASSUMPTIONS UNDERLYING
THE DEBATE ABOUT SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE:
A CLOSER LOOK AT JUROR
'INCOMPETENCE AND SCIENTIFIC
OBJECTIVITY
Michael S. Jacobs*
I. INTRODUCTION
N the past ten years, a number of distinguished scholars, writing
about different areas of the law, have proposed restricting the discre-
tion of trial judges and juries to consider complicated questions of sci-
entific fact. In criminal law, where the so-called Frye rule' has lately
been giving way to more expansive approaches to the admissibility of
novel scientific evidence,2 several authors have proposed the adoption of
various screening methods to assure the trustworthiness of scientific ev-
idence.3 In the areas of toxic torts and products liability, other com-
* Associate Professor, DePaul University College of Law; M.P.H.. Johns Hopkins University
(1987); J.D., Yale Law School (1971); B.A., Dartmouth College (1968).
1. Decided in 1923 by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, Frye
v. United States held that testimony about novel scientific and technical issues could be introduced
into evidence only if the principles underlying the testimony have gained general acceptance in
the particular field in which it belongs. 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
2. Until 1975, when the Federal Rules of Evidence were adopted, many state and federal
courts followed the rule announced in Frye. See Paul C. Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel
Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United States A Half Century Later, 80 COLtPI L REv 1197, 1204-
06 (1980). With the adoption, however, of the Federal Rules, most courts and commentators
began to reject the strict application of Frye, on the grounds that Frye's exclusionary approach
ran counter to the spirit, if not the precise language of the new Rules. See. e.g., United States v.
Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1237 (3d Cir. 1985); United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194, 1198
(2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1117 (1978); 3 JACK B WENSTEN & MARGARET A.
BERGER. WEINsTEN's EVIDENCE 702 [03], at 702-36 (1988) (Elimination of the Frye test is
consistent with the underlying policies of Article 7.).
3. See Margaret A. Berger, A Relevancy Approach to Novel Scientific Evidence, 115 F.R.D.
89 (1987); Paul C. Giannelli, Scientific Evidence: A Proposed Amendment to Federal Rule 702,
115 F.R.D. 102 (1987); Frederic I. Lederer, Resolving the Frye Dilemma-A Reliability Ap-
proach, 115 F.R.D. 84 (1987); James E. Starts, Frye v. United States Restructured and Revital-
ized: A Proposal to Amend Federal Evidence Rule 702, 115 F.R.D. 92 (1987). Professor E.](ViewImageLocal?handle=hein.journals/conlr25&div=48&collection=&method=preview&ext=.png&size=3)
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