Plain Meaning: Justice Scalia's Jurisprudence of Strict Statutory Construction
![handle is hein.journals/hjlpp17 and id is 423 raw text is: PLAIN MEANING: JUSTICE SCALIA'S
JURISPRUDENCE OF STRICT STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION
BRADLEY C. KARKKAINEN*
I. INTRODUCTION
Since his elevation to the Supreme Court of the United States,
Justice Antonin Scalia has aggressively challenged the Court's ap-
proach to statutory interpretation. Justice Scalia has harshly criti-
cized the Court's reliance on legislative history as an aid in
interpreting statutes. He argues that the Court should rely in-
stead in most cases on a statute's plain meaning, derived from
an ordinary understanding of the words and structure of statu-
tory text.
This approach, labelled the new textualism by William Es-
kridge,' has not won general acceptance on the Court. Justice
Scalia's views on statutory interpretation have been articulated
mainly in concurring opinions or dissents; the Court has not
openly endorsed his views in a majority opinion. Only Justices
Anthony Kennedy and Clarence Thomas can be called adherents
of Justice Scalia's plain meaning approach.2 Chief Justice Rehn-
quist and Justice O'Connor frequently join Justice Scalia's opin-
ions, but seldom rely on his approach in their own opinions.'
Justice Souter appears to have decisively rejected Justice Scalia's
* B.A., University of Michigan; J.D. candidate, 1994, Yale Law School. The author
thanks Paul Kahn and Aharon Barak for their helpful comments on earlier drafts, and
Ann Mongoven and Emma Karkkainen Mongoven for their support and boundless
patience.
1. William N. Eskridge,Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REv. 621 (1990) [hereinaf-
ter Eskridge, New Textualism].
2. See, e.g., Connecticut Nat!l Bank v. Germain, 112 S. Ct. 1146, 1149 (1992) (Thomas,
J.) (citing Plain Meaning Rule as a cardinal canon in statutory interpretation); Eli Lilly &
Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 679 (1990) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (criticizing the
Court for departing from plain meaning in interpreting statute exempting certain medi-
cal devices from patent infringement claims).
3. For cases in which these justices join justice Scalia, see, e.g., United States v. Nordic
Village, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 1011 (1992); Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak and Circle
Village, 111 S. Ct. 2578 (1991); West Virginia Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 111 S. Ct. 1138
(1991). For departures from Justice Scalia's plain meaning approach, see, e.g., Rust v.
Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759, 1767-68 (1991) (Rehnquist, CJ.) (finding the statutory language
and legislative history ambiguous, thus justifying deference to administrative agency inter-
pretation of Title X of Public Health Act); Ardestani v. INS, 111 S. Ct. 515, 520
(1991) (O'Connor, J.) (holding that legislative history is ambiguous and does not justify
departure from plain meaning of Equal Access to Justice Act).](ViewImageLocal?handle=hein.journals/hjlpp17&div=36&collection=&method=preview&ext=.png&size=3)
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Plain Meaning: Justice Scalia's Jurisprudence of Strict Statutory Construction
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