About | HeinOnline Law Journal Library | HeinOnline Law Journal Library | HeinOnline
LOG IN
LOG IN

65 Okla. L. Rev. 225 (2012-2013)
A Reasonable Doubt about Reasonable Doubt

handle is hein.journals/oklrv65 and id is 241 raw text is: A REASONABLE DOUBT ABOUT REASONABLE DOUBT MILLER W. SHEALY, JR.* Abstract The Supreme Court has failed to define the concept of reasonable doubt with any precision. The Court tolerates conflicting definitions of reasonable doubt. It permits some jurisdictions to forbid any definition of reasonable doubt, while giving others wide latitude to define the concept in ways that are contradictory. If the Court truly regards the proof beyond a reasonable doubt standard to be an ancient and honored aspect of our criminal justice system,' a bedrock 'axiomatic and elementary' principle whose 'enforcement lies at the foundation of the administration of our criminal law,''2 then the Court cannot continue to tolerate the current state of the law. This article will explore how this came about and propose a new way forward. In short, modem courts have lost sight of the origins of reasonable doubt. Reasonable doubt has roots that stretch back to antiquity. However, we have lost the sense of reasonable doubt which emphasized the fearsome and awesome moral responsibility of judging a fellow human being. This sense of reasonable doubt has deep Judeo-Christian roots, though it is not limited to this perspective. It is simply a reminder that in judging our fellow human beings we are dealing with something unique: a being with dignity and extraordinary worth, a person that is imago dei. It is this sense of reasonable doubt which we must recapture. Table of Contents I. Introduction ............................................................................................ 226 II. The Federal Courts on Reasonable Doubt ............................................ 230 A . The Suprem e C ourt .......................................................................... 230 * Associate Professor of Law, Charleston School of Law, Charleston, South Carolina. I would like to thank those who reviewed earlier drafts of this article, especially Professor Larry Laudan. Also, I am grateful to my colleagues Sheila Scheuerman, Margaret Lawton, Randall Bridwell, Paul Lund, and Jorge Roig for their support and generous counsel. I am also grateful for the assistance of my research assistants, Edward R. Corvey, Christopher S. Lietzow, and Stephanie P. Brown. Any mistakes that remain are, as always, my own. 1. Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 5 (1994). 2. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363 (1970) (quoting Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895)).

What Is HeinOnline?

HeinOnline is a subscription-based resource containing thousands of academic and legal journals from inception; complete coverage of government documents such as U.S. Statutes at Large, U.S. Code, Federal Register, Code of Federal Regulations, U.S. Reports, and much more. Documents are image-based, fully searchable PDFs with the authority of print combined with the accessibility of a user-friendly and powerful database. For more information, request a quote or trial for your organization below.



Short-term subscription options include 24 hours, 48 hours, or 1 week to HeinOnline.

Purchase Access

Contact us for annual subscription options:

Contact Us

Already a HeinOnline Subscriber?

Log In

profiles profiles most