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4 Lancaster B. 1 (1872-1873)

handle is hein.statereports/lancb0004 and id is 1 raw text is: Three Dollars a Year in, advance. T Tfen Cents per Numbter. VOLUME IV. Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. ADAM DIETRICH vs. PENN'A R. R. CO. 1. One who buys a Railroad ticket, is bound to inform himself of the rules and regulations of the Company governing the transit and conduct of its trains. 2. Passengers puichase tickets subject to the rules and regulations of the Company for running its trains, which rules must be reasonable. 3. It does not lie on the Company to bring home no- tice of its rules, in order to establish the terms of the contract of carriage. 4. A regulation that passengers purchasing special tickets at ieduced rates, must ride between points named on the ticket on a continous train, and not allowing them to stop off at intermediate stations, is a reasonable one. Error to the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County. May Term, 1872. (For opinion of the Court below see BAR of May 13th, 1871.) DICKEY and REYNOLDS for Pl'ff in Error. NORTH and BRENEMAN for Def'ts in Error. Opinion of the Court by AGNEW, J. This was a judgment of nonsuit, and the question is, whether the plaintiff's evidence disclosed a case for the jury. Dietrich, the plaintiff was a drover, residing in Lancaster County. On the 11th of March, 1867, he pur- chased a drovers' ticket from Philadelphia to Pittsburgh, and took passage on the Fast-line on the defendant's Railroad. At Lancaster, he got off, and next day (the 12th,)he resumed his journey. When the conductor, Young, came along collecting fares, he declined the plaintiff's ticket on the ground that he had stopped off, and informed him such were his orders. Young told him he must get off at Landibville. After passing Landisville, finding him still on the train, Young told him he must go off at Mount Joy. At Mount Joy, the brakesman put him off, but Young, who observed the brakesman taking him across the track, halloed at him not to put him off in that way; and told Dietrich to get on again. He was then carried to Altoona, wheie Young's portion of the route ended. After leaving Altoona, Hankins, the conductor from Altoona to Pittsburgh, came around, and the plaintiff exhibited his drover's ticket. Hankins refused it and put him off at Gatlit- zin, at the next end of the mountain tunnel. The plaintiff got on without leave, and Han- kins again refusing his ticket, the plaintiff paid his fare from Altoona to Pittsburgh. On his cross-examination, the plaintiff stat- ed that Hankins was not rude or unkind, and told him it was his duty to collect the fare or put him off. Dietrich said to him, I want this tested and I want you to put me off genteelly. The question is therefore simply upon a breach of the contract for carriage, and depends on its Iancasi tr LLIAM 1B. WILEY, PUBLISHER. JUNE 1, 1872. terms. Before examining the terms of the ticket, it is proper to clear the case of some im- material matters. Stress is laid on the state- ment of Wimer, that the restriction as to stopping off, was not intended for such men as he, who shipped stock over the road every week. This clearly has no influence whatever, in ascertaining or interpreting the terms of the ticket; h afterwards purchased from the proper ticket agent. Wimer was a mere freight agent, whose duty had no relation to the sale of tickets, but was confined to giving the required certificate to entitle Dietrich to a drover's ticket. When Dietrich went to Fran- ciscus, and asked him to make the ticket so as to stop off at Lancaster, Franciscus said, no sir. He admits that he knew of the restriction as to stopping off, which his request implies, and that he had seen Young refuse another drover's ticket for this cause, and that in con- sequence he had been in the habit of buying a ticket from Philadelphia to Lancaster, when he wished to stop off. The restriction, and his knowledge of it, if this were necessary, are plainly proved by himself. It is evident there- fore, that the plaintiff is thrown upon his ticket and the terms it imports or recognizes, as the evidence of his right of transit over the defend- ant's road. The ticket is in these words: Drover's ticket. Not good on the Philadel- phia Express. Good only in the hands of Mr. A. Dietrich for one seat from Philadelphia to Pittsburgh. This ticket good only until March 16th, 1867. Issued March 11, 1867. S. H1. Wallace, agent. On the back is stamped Penna. R. R., March 11th, 1867. Philadelphia. Such tickets are evidence of the payment of the fare, and of the right of the holder or party named, as here, to be carried according to its terms, So far as they are expressed the terms are binding of course, but such tickets are not the whole contract, which must be gathered so for as not expressed, from the rules and regu- lations of the Company in running its trains. This is the generally received doctrine; with the qualification however, that these rules and regulations must be reasonable, and not con- trary to the terms expressed. See Johnson vs. The Concord R. R. Co., 46 New Hampshire Rep. 213 and cases there cited. The State vs. Overton, 4 Zabriskie 435; The Clev., Col. & Cin. R. R. Co. vs. S. 11. Bartram, 11 Ohio St. Rep. 437; Cheney vs. the Boston & Maine R. R. Co., 11 Metcalf 121. With the same qualifi- cations of reasonableness it is also well settled that one who buy a ticket is bound to inform himself of the rules and regulations of the com- pany governing the transit and conduct of its trains. Thus he must ascertain the train in which he is to go, the time of its departure and arrival, its stopping stations, his right to get off and get on, to resume his trips, &c. See the cases supra. If the law were otherwise a railroad company could not regulate the run- ning of its trains to suit the interests of the public or of themselves. For this purpose some trains must be fast, with few stoppages. Others must be slow, with frequent stoppages. Some must be through trains and others local. It is very clear that a passenger with a through ticket cannot require a local train to carry him through. Nor can he require a through train to stop at a way station not in its time table, His even having a stop-off ticket would not in- crease his right to require the train to stop at a station not in its time-table. It is evident that if in such cases the hold ers of tickets can compel the trains to alter regulations, they would be governed by the passengers, and not by the company. An excursion party on this principle, stopping off at will, would overcrowd a subsequent train to the discomfort of the proper passengers, and to the prejudice of the interests of the company. The authorities, as well as the reason of the thing, shows that the company must make its own regulations, and that pas- sengers purchase their tickets suoject to thes reasonable rules, and that it does not lie on the company to bring home notice of them in order to establish the terms of the contract of carriage In this case, the testimony of the plaintiff himself clearly shows that his ticket did not entitle him to stop off at Lancaster, and if notice were necessary that he knew that fact. This brings us now to the question, whether the face of the ticket, by its terms, imports a right to stop off. The first noticeable and very obvious thing, is, that the terms on the face of the ticket are very restrictive. It is expressad to be a Drover's ticket. It cannot be used by any other than a drover. Then it is not good on the Philad'a Express; it is good only in the hands of Mr. A. Dietrich; no one else can use it-then, this ticket is good only un- til March 16th, 1867. It is therefore not good after that day. It is restrictive from the be- ginning to the end, and is wholly unlike a general ticket which any holder may use, within any reasonable time, and yet even as to such tickets, the authorities are clear- the right to stop off at intermediate unnamed points, does not exist unless by means of stop- off tickets, or the customary rules of passage. The expressed terms of a drover's ticket being all restrictive without exception, it gives no countenance to an implied right to stop off. The reason is obvious also-the ticket is sold at less than half-price-that is, this was for five dollars, instead of eleverl. Its purpose is special, and the restriction in time ( until the 16th of March,) was to prevent abuse of the benefit intended to be conferred on a particu- lar class of persons. With all these restric- tions on the face of the ticket, and in full view of the purpose of the ticket, it is obviously im P1ublication Office, No* 19 Norths D~uke Street, Law avter, -Pa. NUMBER 1.

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