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Henry Wheaton and Robert Donaldson, Appellants v. Richard Peters and John Grigg 591 (1834)

handle is hein.slavery/ussccases0123 and id is 1 raw text is: JANUARY TERM 1834. 591 HENRY WHEATON AND ROBERT DONALDSON, APPELLANTS V. RICHARD PETERS AND JOHN GRIGG. Copyright. From the authorities cited in the opinion of the court, and others which might be referred to, the law appears to be well settled in England, that, since the statute of 8 Anne, the literary property of an author in his works can only be asserted under the statute; and that notwithstanding the opinion of a majority of the judges in the great case of Miller v. Taylor was in favour of the common law right, before the statute; it is still consi- dered in England as a question by no means free from doubt. That an author at common law has a property in his manuscript, and may obtain redress against any one who deprives him of it, or by obtaining a copy endeavours to realize a profit by its publication, cannot be doubted ; but this is a very different right from that which asserts a perpetual and exclusive property in the future publication of the work, after the author shall have published it to the world, The argument, that a literary man is as much entitled- to the product of his labour as any other member of society, cannot be controverted, And the answer is, that he realizes this product in the sale of his works, when first published. In what respect does the right of an author differ from that of an individual who has invented a most useful and valuable machine? In the production of this, his mind has been as intensely enghged, as long and perhaps as usefully to the public, as any distinguished author in the composition of his book. The result of their labours may be equally beneficial to society ; and in their respective spheres, they may be alike distinguished for mental vigour. Does the common law give a perpetual right to the author, and withhold it from the inventor ? And yet it has never been pretended that the latter could hold, by the common law, any property in his invention, after he shall have sold it publicly. It would seem therefore that the exist- ence of a principle which operates so unequally, may well be doubted. This is not a characteristic of the common law. It is said to be founded on prin- ciples ofjustice, and that all its rules must conform to sound reason. That a man is entitled to the fruits of his own labours must be admitted; but he can enjoy them only, except by statutory provision, under the rules of property which regulate society, and which define the rights of things in general. It is clear, there can be no common law-of the United States. The federal government is composed of twenty-four sovereign and independent states, each of which 11a1 have its local usages, customs and common law. There is no principle which pervades the union, and has the authority of law, that is not embodied in the constitution or laws of the union. The common law could be made a part of our system by legislative asdoption. When a common law right is asserted, we look to the state in which the con- troversy originat'd. When the ancestors of the citizens of the United States migrated to this

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