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![handle is hein.slavery/ssactsengr1043 and id is 1 raw text is: THE KING V. THAMES DITTON
for 99 years, if he the said Richard Parson should so long live, in trust for himself.
The lessor of the plaintiff was Thomas Parson, the nephew of the devisor, to whom
he devised the remainder in fee.
Lawrence, for the plaintiff.-Although the Court has referred to the case of
Goodright v. Pullyn (a)', as in point, [299] yet I conceive there is some difference. It
is now settled that if there is a clear intent it will make an estate for life. If all the
v ords in the will can have effect, they shall. In Goodright v. Pullyn it was held, that
the superadded limitation in fee could not make words of a purchase, for then the
words heirs male would be rejected. Here the superadded limitation is very
different from the first limitation, and there is no doubt to what it refers. I conceive
that the words heirs male mean first and other sons. If it is not construed to be
a life estate, the subsequent limitation must be rejected. This is similar to the case
put by Anderson in Shelley's case (b). With regard to the intent, Bagshaw v. Spencer (c)
is in point. [Cur.-That was a trust estate, and the case does not apply.] The
second limitation here is in tail general, the first in tail male. The testator therefore
meant that the first words should be words of purchase. Besides, he had in contempla-
tion a dying within 21, which is not like an indefinite failure of issue.
Butt, contra.-This case is fully within the principle of Goodright v. Pullyn.
Lord Mansfield.-In the times of tenure it was a rule that an estate should not be
limited to an ancestor with a remainder to his heir, because it destroyed the rights of
tenure. Since that time the Courts have inclined to narrow the rule, because the
reason upon which it was grounded has ceased, and words of limitation may in many
cases be words of purchase. But this is within the principle of adjudged cases. In
Arbrose v. Bodgson (d) the Court for the sake of certainty adhered to the rule
established.
Willes and Asburst, Justices, were of the same opinion.
Buller, Justice, mentioned King v. Burchell (e).
Postea to the defendant (f).
[300] THE KING v. THE INHABITANTS OF THAMEs DITTON (a)2. Wednesday,
27th April, 1785. A negro brought into this country by her master, and
continuing to serve him here for a year, does not gain a settlement, for there
is no hiring.
Charlotte Howe was removed under an order of two justices, from the parish of
Thames Ditton, in Surry, to the parish of St. Luke's, Ch-elsea, in Middlesex. Upon
(a)' B. R., M. 13 Geo. 1, 2 Lord Raym. 1437; and see Dean dem. Webb v. Puckey,
B. R., T. 33 Geo. 3, 5 T. R. 299.
(b) 1 Co. 95 b.
(c) 1 Ves. sen. 142; 2 Atk. 246; 1 Coll. Jur. 378.
(d) Ante, vol. i. p. 337.
(e) Ambl. 379, cited 2 Burr. 1103; 4 T. R. 396 (u).
(f) The present is a middle case between the case put by Anderson, where the
second limitation to the heirs is narrower than the first, and the cases cited of Goodright
v. Pullyn and King v. Burchell, where the second limitation is in fee. Here the first
limitation is in tail male, the second limitation in tail general, and the case therefore
comes within the principle of Goodright v. Pullyn and King v. Burehell, according to
the reasoning of Mr. Fearne. There does not appear to be the same inconsistency in
construing the first words, which describe heirs special, to be words of limitation,
where the superadded words extend to heirs general, as there is where the first words
and those engrafted on them distinguish two different incompatible courses of descent,
and would not carry the fee to the same persons. In the latter case it is absolutely
impossible by any implied qualification to reconcile the superadded words to those
preceding them, so as to satisfy both by construing the first as words of limitation;
whereas in the former case the superadded words are not contrary to or incompatible
with the preceding, but in their general sense include them; and there is no improba-
bility in the supposition, that they were used by the testator in the same qualified
sense as the preceding, and then both may be satisfied by taking the first as words of
limitation.-Fearne on Cont. Rem. 183, 7th edition.
(a)2 S. C. 2 Bott, 209, 6th edit.; from Serjt. Wilson's MSS.
891
4 DOUGL 299.](ViewImageLocal?handle=hein.slavery/ssactsengr1043&div=1&collection=&method=preview&ext=.png&size=3)