HeinOnline is a subscription-based resource containing thousands of academic and legal journals from inception; complete coverage of government documents such as U.S. Statutes at Large, U.S. Code, Federal Register, Code of Federal Regulations, U.S. Reports, and much more. Documents are image-based, fully searchable PDFs with the authority of print combined with the accessibility of a user-friendly and powerful database. For more information, request a quote or trial for your organization below.
![handle is hein.slavery/ssactsengr0967 and id is 1 raw text is: LE FANU V. MALCOMSON [1848]
of the direction of the liberty way, and knew that part of the liberty way extends
within the wall which was erected by the plaintiff. The knowledge then amounts to
nothing; he had no knowledge which would show that he was guilty of any fraudulent
misrepresentation. Therefore, my lords, in the light in which I view this case, it
seems to me that the decree cannot be supported.
With regard to the case of Edwards v. M'Leay, I most reverentially regard it. I
think there is no case of higher authority to be found in our law books. It was de-
cided by Sir Win. Grant, on the most unexceptionable principles, and it was supported
by my Lord Eldon, and he in the most pithy manner states the principle on which he
proceeded. This is the principle on which he acts: If one party makes a representa-
tion which he knows to be false, but the falsehood of which the other party had no
means of knowing, this court will rescind the contract.
Now, my lords, this is the first case that we have cited before us, or to be found, of
a bill in equity to set aside such a transaction, and we have as yet no authority to go
further than Edwards v. M'Leay. That is the guide on one side: then what is the
guide on the other? The case decided by Lord Manners, a judge of very great ex-
perience and very great intelligence, whose opinion on such a question is to be re-
garded with high respect-that case is the guide on the other side, to show you what
you ought to avoid. You may go so far as Edwards v. M'Leay; but [636] then you
are told how far you are not to go by the warning in the other case.
For these reasons, I am clearly of opinion that this bill ought to have been dis-
missed, with costs; and that is all that'can be given to the defendant, on whom some
hardship is thrown, but of course that is a hardship which, under all the circumstances,
must be suffered, for we cannot give her the costs of the appeal.
Mr. Bethell.-We have been compelled to pay the costs in the court below; they
must be returned, and probably your Lordships will add to your order what you did
under the same circumstances, in Attwood v. Small (see 6 Clark and Fin. 523; and
3 You. and Coll. 105, 501).
Lord Brougham.-Our judgment is that the bill, instead of leading to the decree
cancelling the conveyance, ought to have been dismissed with costs; consequently, if
any costs have been paid in the court below by the appellant, they must be repaid.
Mr. Bethell.-The order of the House in Attwood v. Small, was that the bill be
dismissed, with costs, and then there was a reference to the court to carry that
direction into effect. I only want the same words as in that case. Your Lordships
did the same in the case of the Stockton and Darlington Railway Compalqy v. Barrett
(11 Clark and Fin. 590).
[It was ordered that the decree of the 5th of December, 1843, and an order of the
25th of March, 1845, be reversed, and that the costs directed by the said decree be
repaid to the appellants, and that the bill in the court below be dismissed with costs,
including the costs of the proceedings under the said decree and order, except the
appellant's costs of exceptions to the master's report, as to which each party was by
consent to bear their own costs. And it was further ordered that the cause be remitted
to the Court of Chancery to do therein as shall be just, etc.-See Lords' Jour. for the
6th of June, 1848.]
[637] JOSEPH LE FANU, and EDWARD BULL,-Plaintiffs in Error; JOSEPH
MALCOMSON and Others,-Defendants in Error [June 27, 1848].
[Mews'Dig. v. 611, 619. S.C. 8 Ir. L.R. 418; 13 L.T. O.S. 61. As to actions by part-
ners, see Haythorn v. Lawson, 1827, 3 C. and P. 196; Robinson v. Marchant,
1845, 7 Q.B. 918; R.S.C. 1883, Ord. 16, r. 1; Ord. 18, r. 6. As to application
of general words to individual, see White v. Mellin (1895), A.C. 154.]
Libel-Pleading.
Though defamatory matter may appear only to apply to a class of individuals,
yet if the descriptions in such matter are capable of being, by inuendo, shown
to be directly applicable to any one individual of that class, an action may be
maintained by such individual in respect of the publication of such matter.
In such a case the inuendo does not extend the sense of the defamatory matter, but
I H.L.C., 636](ViewImageLocal?handle=hein.slavery/ssactsengr0967&div=1&collection=&method=preview&ext=.png&size=3)