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![handle is hein.slavery/ssactsengr0895 and id is 1 raw text is: PATERSON V.: MURPHY
a maker of pins of this description may say, I, John Smith, manufacture and sell
Tayler's Solid Headed Pins; and the Court would not in such a case grant an
injunction to restrain the use of that name. It was said that when a patent expired
it was open to the public at large to adopt the description of the article by which it
had become known to the world, and to use the label by which the articles made by
the Plaintiffs had been theretofore distinguished. It does not, however, follow, because
upon the expiration of the patent the article and its known description became open
to all, that therefore all would become entitled to use the label by which the paten-
[86]-tees had been accustomed to distinguish their goods. The public may have
acquired confidence in that particular label, and that confidence may have given a
value to it which the patentees may be entitled to have protected after the expiration
of their patent.
It was contended that the Plaintiffs were not the patentees, and that they had no
title to the label ; but it is not the patent, but the continuous use of the label for
a certain period of time, which confers the right to protection ; and the length of time
during which this use by the Plaintiffs and those to whose rights they have succeeded
existed is a sufficient title.
It has also been contended that the Plaintiffs, by describing their manufacture as
a patented article, without any explanation that the exclusive privilege of the patent
had expired, were guilty of a misrepresentation, and did not therefore come into
Court with clean hands, or put forward a right which the Court would respect. I am
particularly anxious that it should be understood that all persons applying to this
Court for its extraordinary interposition by way of injunction should shew that they
themselves have not been guilty of fraud or misrepresentation ; and that, if they have
made any representations to the public, they must shew that such representations
have not been made without foundation or with any fraudulent intention. If, there-
fore, in this case there had never been any patent granted for the manufacture of
these pins, or if after the term of the patent had expired the Plaintiffs had taken up
the use of the term patented as descriptive of their manufacture, and had first
circulated the labels in that form, I should probably have thought that the case came
within this ground of objection to the interference of the Court. But here that was
not so; the blocks for the labels had been made during the existence of the patent,
when the [87] representation was perfectly true. The Plaintiffs became the pro-
prietors of the rights of the original patentees, and of the blocks, labels and other
property: and those labels, which, as the external demonstration of the article, had
acquired a certain value or had attracted a certain degree of confidence, they continued
to use. It is no doubt to be much preferred that no representation should be issued
to the public which is not strictly true; but in a case in which the goods have become
known by a description which was originally accurate in every part, if I were to hold
that the continued use of this description disentitled the party to the assistance of the
Court it would be going much farther than I did in refusing to interfere by injunction
where the Plaintiff had adopted and used the word patent untruly and without
foundation. (See Flavel v. Harrison, 10 Hare, 467.)
With regard to the argument of the Defendants that the injunction would be an
injury to their business, the answer is that that will not be so if their case be true.
If on the contrary they allege that it will be an injury or impediment to the sale of
their goods if they are restrained from using the Plaintiffs' wrappers, it. appears to
me that they confess the whole case.
The Court granted an injunction restraining the Defendants from using labels
containing any inscription intending or appearing to designate the pins manufactured
by the Defendants as being made by D. F. Tayler & Co. or by the Plaintiffs.
[88] PATERSON v. MURPHY. Feb. 25, 1853.
[S. C. 22 L. J. Ch. 882; 17 Jur. 298.]
A lady, who had lent a sum of money on an equitable mortgage by a deposit of title-
deeds, signed a memorandum accompanying the deposit, which expressed that the
1.198
11 ELARE, 86.](ViewImageLocal?handle=hein.slavery/ssactsengr0895&div=1&collection=&method=preview&ext=.png&size=3)