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![handle is hein.slavery/ssactsengr0850 and id is 1 raw text is: ELLIOTT V. ELLIOTT
Majesty's plantations and colonies in America), it is enacted that the houses, lands,
negroes and other hereditaments and real estates, situate or being within any of the
said plantations belonging t'o any person indebted, shall be liable to and chargeable
with all just debts, duties and demands, of what nature or kind soever, owing by any
such person to His Majesty, or any of his subjects, and shall and may be assets for
the satisfaction thereof, in like manner as real estates are, by the law of England,
liable to the satisfaction of debts due by bond or other specialty, and shall be subject
to the like remedies, proceedings and process, in any Court of law or Equity in any
of the said plantations, respectively, for seizing, extending, selling or disposing of any
such houses, lands, negroes and other hereditaments and real estates, towards the
satisfaction of such debts, duties and demands, and in like manner as personal estates
in any of the said plantations respectively are seized, extended, sold or disposed of
for the satisfaction of debts.
[275] That enactment and the construction put upon it by Sir T. Plumer in
Thomson v. Grant (1 Russ. 540, note) were relied upon by
Mr. Knight Bruce and Mr. Berkeley, who contended that the estate was made
legal assets by the Act of Parliament, and that it was not in the power of the testator
to make it equitable assets.
Mr. Jacob, Mr. Blunt and Mr. Cole were the other counsel in the cause.
THE VICE-CHANCELLOR rSir L. Shadwell] said that, as the Act of Geo. 2 had not
taken away the power which testators had before the passing of that Act to dispose
of their estates so as to make them equitable assets, that power still remained; and,
consequently, the estate in question was equitable assets.
[276] ELLIOTT V. ELLIOTT. July 16, 1841.
[S. C. 10 L. J. Ch. 363. Followed, In re Coppard's Estate, 1887, 35 Ch. D. 350. See
In re Wenmouth's Estate, 1887, 37 Ch. D. 270. Distinguished, In re Mervin [1891],
3 Ch. 203.]
Will. Construction. Remoteness.
Testator gave the residue of his personal estate unto and among all and every the
children, sons and daughters, of his daughter Elizabeth, in equal shares and pro-
portions, as and when they should attain their respective ages of twenty-two years.
Held, that the children of the testator's daughter living at the testator's death were
the only objects of the bequest; and, consequently, that it was not void for
remoteness.
The testator in this cause gave a legacy of Y1000 to his daughter Elizabeth Elliott,
and all other his personal estate and effects unto and among all and every the children,
sons and daughters, of his said daughter, in equal shares and proportions, as and when
they should attain their respective ages of twenty-two years; and he directed the
interest on their respective shares to be accumulated and to be paid to them as and
when the principal should be payable.
Mrs. Elliott had four children living at the testator's death, and one born four
years afterwards.
Mr. J. H. Palmer, for the Plaintiff Mrs. Elliott, who was the testator's sole next
of kin, said that the residue was given to all the children of Mrs. Elliott as a class;
and, as their shares were not to vest in them until they attained the age of twenty-
two, the gift was wholly void for remoteness. Leake v. Robinson (2 Mer. 363); Vawdry
v. Geddes (1 Russ. & Myl. 203 ; see Comport v. Austen, ante, 218).
Mr. Knight Bruce and Mr. Hare, for the children of Mrs. Elliott, said that where
a bequest was made to A. for life, and after A.'s death to his children, the testator
was taken to mean all the children who might come into existence during A.'s life;
but, where no prior life interest was given, the testator must be supposed [277] to
mean all the children who might be in existence at his death. Viner v. Francis (2
Cox, 190), and Davidson v. Dallas (14 Ves. 576).
12 SIX. 275.
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