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![handle is hein.slavery/ssactsengr0825 and id is 1 raw text is: practice of conveyancers. It is impossible to believe that the parties intended that
[218] this (the most important part of their property), which was of the value of
£22,000, should pass by a deed which made no reference whatever to it, under these
vague and general words, and all other, &c., property, &c.
It is evident, from the recitals and the frame of the deed, that the intention was
to deal merely with the securities belonging to the bank. The general words must
therefore be construed with reference to that intention, and be held insufficient to
pass this property.
Mr. Hobhouse, in reply.
Moore v. Magrath (Cowp. 9); Rooke v. Lord Kensington (2 Kay & J. 753), and
Walsh v. Trevanion (15 Q. B. Rep. 733), were cited.
Jan. 16. THE MASTER OF THE ROLLS (Sir John Romilly]. The Lothbury
property cannot, I think, be held to pass by this deed. The scope and object of it
were obviously to convey to new trustees all the securities for debts due to the bank,
which were then vested in Oxenford.
The general recital of the request made by the bank to Oxenford to transfer the
trust property vested in him, though including all the property, must have reference
to what goes before and must mean all the trust property vested in him for securing
debts due to the banking company.
[219] The property is assigned by three witnessing parts, the first and second
only relate to securities for money, and I could not include leaseholds under the
general words, in a case where the securities intended are carefully designated.
The third witnessing part assigns leaseholds, which are expressly specified, and
the general words, which, it is to be observed, do not contain the words all other
leaseholds, cannot, I think, apply to the Lothbury property.
My conviction is that a conveyancer would have prepared two deeds, keeping the
title to the securities and these leaseholds distinct.
If a second deed were now produced conveying the Lothbury property, the same
argument might be used, that they passed by the first deed. What the parties really
intended is specified, and the deed is a well-drawn deed for effecting their purpose,
and although general words are introduced, they have reference to the property
previously specified.
Judging of the intention, as shewn by the recitals, the witnessing parts, the state
of the property, and the mode of dealing with it, I am of opinion that the Lothbury
leaseholds did not pass, and I must, therefore, answer the special case in the
negative.
[220] LUFF v. LORD. Nov. 25, Dec. 2, 7, 1864.
[S. C. 11 L. T. 656; 10 Jur. (N. S.) 1248; affirmed, 11 L.-T. 695; 11 Jur. (N. S.) 50.
See In re Bie's Estate, 1873, L. R. 16 Eq. 580; Plowright v. Lambert, 1885,
52 L. T. 653.]
A trustee for sale cannot purchase the trust property, but an ordinary trustee may
purchase the trust property from his cestuis que trust, though the burden of proving
the propriety of the transaction lies on the trustee.
A legacy was bequeathed payable as soon as legal proceedings connected with the
fund out of which it was to be paid should be terminated. Held, that this was
neither a reversionary interest nor a contingent legacy.
In 1862 a trustee purchased from his cestuis que trust, for £450, a legacy of £2000,
payable on the termination of a litigation, which had been pending many years.
The litigation ended in 1863. The Court supported the sale, though the vendor
was in distressed circumstances, on the following grounds :-The vendor well knew
his position and employed his own solicitor, the proposals for the sale proceeded
from the vendor, after unavailing attempts to sell elsewhere, the trustee was an
unwilling purchaser, and the sale was only completed upon threats of the cestui que
trust to file a bill for the specific performance, the assets, out of which the legacy
was to be paid, were in litigation and doubt, so as to make the property unmarket-
able, and the legacy was subject to the right of the vendor's wife to a settlement
and to her right by survivorship.
34 ER.V. 218&
LUFF V. LORD
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