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![handle is hein.slavery/ssactsengr0780 and id is 1 raw text is: 4 DE G. J. & S. 149. HALL V. BARROWS .873
be a wilful false statement I will not stop to inquire whether it be too gross to
mislead.
I am told that the Vice-Chancellor put the case of Morrison's pills, and concluded
that the present maker of that medicine, though not bearing the name of Morrison,
would be protected in the exclusive use of the appellation ; and rightly, because the
words Morrison's pills have become the name of the thing sold, in the same
manner as James's powder is the name of a celebrated medicine, and as the words
Macintosh, Brougham and Wellingtons are the designations of different
articles. So in the present case, the cloth made and sold by the Plaintiffs might be
properly called and sold by them as Crockett's Leather Cloth, for that has become
the proper designation of the manufacture.
The Vice-Chancellor is apprehensive that if he refuses the Plaintiff relief he must
hold that where the name of a deceased partner is continued in the firm by his sur-
viving partners they would be guilty of a fraud upon the public. To continue the
old style of a firm is a very different thing from making false representations with
respect to a vendible commodity in order to give it greater value, and create for it a
greater demand in the market. The Plaintiffs impose upon the public by selling
goods, which are in reality made by themselves at their manu-[149]-factory at West
.Ham, as being the goods of the Crockett International Leather Cloth Company,
and as having been manufactured by J. R. & C. P. Crockett, who were the original
inventors and manufacturers ; and further, they describe and sell untanned goods as
being tanned and included in a patent which has not yet expired. Their request is
to be protected, and therefore justified, in continuing to make these untrue statements
to the public in order to secure a monopoly for their commodity.
There is a homely phrase, long current in this Court, that a Plaintiff must come
into equity with clean hands. That is not the case with the present Plaintiffs, whose
case is condemned by the principles to which they appeal, and I must therefore
reverse the decree of the Vice-Chancellor and dismiss their bill; but, as I do not
approve of the conduct of the Defendants, I dismiss it without costs.
This decision was affirmed on the Plaintiffs' appeal to the House of Lords
(11 H. L. Ca. 523).
(1) Law's Digest of American cases relating to Patents for Inventions and Copy-
rights, New York, 1862, p. 688; S. C., How. App. Cases, 559, 561 ; 2 Sandford's Ch.
Rep. 622; 2 Barbour's New York Ch. Rep. 101.
[150] HALL v. BARROWS. Before the Lord Chancellor Lord Westbury.
Nov. 2, 3, Dec. 21, 1863.
[S. C. 32 L. J. Ch. 548; 8 L. T. 227; I N. R. 543; 11 W. R. 525; 33 L. J. Ch. 204;
9 L. T. 561; 10 Jur. (N. S.), 55; 12 W. R. 322. See 4insworth. v. Walmsley,
1866, L. R. 1 Eq. 524; Maxwell v. Hogg, 1867, L. R. 2 Ch. 313; Reynolds v.
Bulloc, 1878, 47 L. J. Ch. 774; Steuart v. Gladstone, 1879, 10 Ch. D. 653; Singer
Manufacturing Company v. Loog, 1882, 8 App. Cas. 33; Goodfellow v. Plince, 1887,
35 Ch. D. 13; Borthwick v. The Evening Post, 1888, 37 Ch. D. 453.]
The jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery in the protection of trade marks rests
upon property, and fraud in the Defendant is not necessary for the exercise of that
jurisdiction.
Observations on dicta to the contrary, and as to why imposition on the public is
necessary for the Plaintiff's title.
The name of the first maker of an article may in time become a mere sign of the
quality of the article, and cease to be a representation that the article is the manu-
facture of any particular person.
Observations on the distinction between a name and a trade mark, and the respective
legal rights flowing from them.
Where, in the judgment of the Court, certain iiitial letters, surmounted by a crown,
had, although originally representing the names of certain partners, become and
were a trade mark; that is, a brand which had reputation and currency in the
C. xxv.-28*](ViewImageLocal?handle=hein.slavery/ssactsengr0780&div=1&collection=&method=preview&ext=.png&size=3)