HeinOnline is a subscription-based resource containing thousands of academic and legal journals from inception; complete coverage of government documents such as U.S. Statutes at Large, U.S. Code, Federal Register, Code of Federal Regulations, U.S. Reports, and much more. Documents are image-based, fully searchable PDFs with the authority of print combined with the accessibility of a user-friendly and powerful database. For more information, request a quote or trial for your organization below.
![handle is hein.slavery/ssactsengr0759 and id is 1 raw text is: The order ought, I think, to be altered in this manner :- That the fifth article of
the scheme contained in the Master's report, seeming to assume that the master of the
college or hospital might be non-resident, and it appearing to the Court that it was
intended by the charter, and by the laws and statutes of the charity, and that it is
essential to the proper performance of the duties of the master of the college or
hospital that there should be a proper residence for the master within the college or
hospital, or the lands belonging thereto; let it be referred back to the Master to
review his report in respect of the matters aforesaid, and let the Master inquire and
state to the Court whether there is in the college or hospital a fit residence for the
master; and in case the Master shall find that there is not, then let the Master inquire
in what manner it is proper that such residence should be provided for the master
within the college, or upon the lands belonging thereto, and what sum of money it
will require to provide such residence, and in what manner, and out of what fund or
funds, such sum ought to be raised ; and let the Master state any special circumstances
with respect to any of such matters.
The Appellant has in substance failed in his appeal. He cannot, therefore, have
the costs of it out of the fund; but, under the circumstances, I do not think he ought
to pay the costs of the other parties. Their costs must come out of the fund, as the
other costs of the cause.
[145J Between JUSTINIAN VERNON, Plaintiff; and JOHN VERNON, JAMES NEWMAN,
and WILLIAM FRASER, WILLIAM MAXWELL ALEXANDER, CLAUD NEILSON, and
BOYD ALEXANDER, Defendants. Feb. 3, 4, 1837.
[See Baker v. JVetton, 1845, 14 Sim. 426.]
Where two inconsistent statements are made in a bill, a Defendant is entitled, upon
demurrer, to adopt that which is most against the Plaintiff's interest.
It appeared by the statements made in a bill, that in September 1794 a father, tenant
for life, and his eldest son, tenant in tail, of a plantation and slaves, subject to a
lease, suffered a recovery, and limited the property to the father for life, with
remainder to the son for life, with remainder to the son's first and other sons in
tail. The bill then stated that in the year 1794, not specifying at what part of
the year, the lessee removed some of the slaves to a plantation which belonged to
himself, and then sold that plantation with the slaves upon it; and that afterwards,
while the father was still living, the lessee, having represented to the son that there
was some difficulty in distinguishing the slaves which belonged to the settled estate
from those which were the propei-ty of the lessee, prevailed upon the son to give
him a deed of indemnity against his (the son's) claims in respect of the slaves so
removed and sold; and the bill stated that the son was at the time wholly ignorant
of the nature and extent of the sale, and of the circumstances stated by the lessee.
Held, that upon these statements a Defendant was entitled, for the purposes of a
demurrer, to infer that the removal of the slaves took place before the month of
September 1794, and while the son was still tenant in tail; and that the son was
cognisant of their removal at the time.
Where a bill had set forth the limitations of a settlement in such manner as to
shew that the Plaintiff's father, who was still living, was tenant for life, with
remainder to the Plaintiff as teilant in tail; but subsequent parts of the bill had
spoken of the father as tenant in tail, and of the Plaintiff as heir in tail. Held,
that the Defendant was entitled, on demurrer, to consider that the Plaintiff had
merely stated himself to be issue in tail, in which character he would have no right
to institute the suit.
A demurrer for want of parties and for want of equity was allowed, and the Plaintiff
appealed, but admitted at the bar that the bill was defective for want of parties.
The Lord Chancellor expressed strong disapprobation of the appeal, as the only
question could be whether the old bill should be amended or a new bill be filed.
Amendment permitted in a case in which the Court had reason to believe that
allegations, upon the ground of which a demurrer had been allowed, had crept into
the bill by accident.
596
VERNON V. VERNON
2 MY. & OR. 145.](ViewImageLocal?handle=hein.slavery/ssactsengr0759&div=1&collection=&method=preview&ext=.png&size=3)