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![handle is hein.slavery/ssactsengr0735 and id is 1 raw text is: JONES V. FROST
perfect and equivocal, admitting either of no meaning at all by themselves, or of a
variety of different meanings, referring tacitly or expressly for the ascertainment
and completion of the meaning to extrinsic circumstances, it has never been con-
sidered an objection to the reception of the evidence of those circumstances, that
the ambiguity was patent, manifested on the face of the instrument. When a legacy
is given to a man by his surname, and the Christian name is not mentioned ; is not
that a patent ambiguity 2 Yet, it is decided, that evidence is admissible. (Price v.
Page, 4 Ves. 680.) So where there is a gift of the testator's stock, that is ambiguous,
it has different meanings when used by a farmer and a merchant. So with a bequest
of jewels ; if by a nobleman, it would pass all ; but if by a jeweller, it would not
pass those that he had in his shop. [Thus, the same expression may vary in meaning
according to the circumstances of the testator.
To show how mistaken the idea is, that extrinsic evidence is never to be received
in cases of patent ambiguity, we may refer to a case in the House of Lords, [465] un-
questionably of that description, where the evidence was admitted. I mean the
case of Doe. dein. Jersey v. Smith. Mr. Justice Bayley thus states the principle on
which it was introduced. The evidence here is not to produce a construction
against the direct and natural meaning of the words ; not to controul a provision
which was distinct and accurately described ; but because there is an ambiguity upon
the face of the instrument ; because an indefinite expression is used capable of being
satisfied in more ways than one ; and I look to the state of the property at the time,
to the estate and interest the settlor had, and the situation in which she stood with
regard to the property she was settling, to see whether that estate, or interest, or
situation, would assist us in judging what was her meaning by that indefinite
expression. (2 Brod. & Bing. 553.)
If it were necessary, I could refer to many other instances of resorting to extrinsic
matter in cases of patent ambiguity ; but this decision I ground upon the case of
Fonnereau v. Poyntz.
His Honour doth declare, that the several legacies to which the Plaintiffs are
entitled under the testator's will, are not to be considered as legacies of long annuities,
but only pecuniary legacies to the amount of so much gross sums respectively, and
his Honour doth also declare, that Patience Baker, Ann Bloomfield, and William
Colpoys, are the only legatees entitled to have their legacies considered as legacies of
long annuity stock.
Reg. Lib. A. 1821, fo. 972.
[466] JONES v. FROST. March 16, 1822.
Demurrer allowed to a bill praying that a pretended will might be delivered up to
be cancelled, and an injunction and a receiver, till letters of administration should
be granted ; the pendency of a suit in the Ecclesiastical Court not being distinctly
alleged, and the Court of Chancery not having jurisdiction to try the validity of
the will.
This case is reported upon the original hearing before the Vice-Chancellor, in
3 Madd. 1. The Plaintiffs appealed from his order, allowing the demurrer.
Mr. Hart, Mr. Agar, and Mr. Roupell, for the Plaintiffs, contended that the form
of the demurrer was bad, several causes of demurrer being assigned, which was
objectionable in the same way as a double plea ; it must be overruled if any of the
causes assigned were bad, as was the case here. And, with respect to the equity of
the bill, they cited Atkinson v. Henshaw (2 Ves. & B. 85), and argued, that a case
was stated, calling for the Court to interpose a receiver, pending the proceedings
in the Ecclesiastical Court.
Mr. Shadwell and Mr. Barber, on the other side, argued, that the bill did not
contain any distinct allegation of the pendency of a suit in the Ecclesiastical Court.
The delivery up of the will and the other matters prayed for were not within the
jurisdiction of this Court, and on this point they referred to Jones v. Jones (3 Mer.
161). Demurrers for several different causes are very common ; ii any one of the
causes assigned holds good, the demurrer is allowed. Harrison v. Hogg (3 Ves.
323) is an instance.
The Lord Chancellor [Eldon]. The common language of the Court, with respect
JACOB, 465.](ViewImageLocal?handle=hein.slavery/ssactsengr0735&div=1&collection=&method=preview&ext=.png&size=3)