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![handle is hein.slavery/ssactsengr0603 and id is 1 raw text is: ROGERS V. RAJENDRO DUTT L1860] Vni MOORz IND. APP., 125
discloses no cause for action, and, even if such existed, which we deny, we further
insist that the damages are excessive; and that they ought only to have been nominal.
Mr. Montague Smith, Q.C., and Mr. H. Mills, for the Respondents.-If the order
of the Appellant was a wrongful act, it is actionable. He had the control of all the
pilots in the Government service upon the river Hooghly, and it is impracticable for
ships to navigate that river without a pilot. If the pilots disobeyed the order of
the Appellant, they were liable to be punished; the obedience of the pilots to this
order rendered also that of Masters of vessels necessary. The effect of their obeying
the order was to prevent the owners of the Undmerriter obtaining any employment
in their lawful trade or calling. This the Appellant knew, his avowed object being
punishment of the Respondents for refusal to tow under Government certificate.
Now, the issuing such an order was an improper exercise of his power, and a tortuous
act as agaigst the Respondents; being done without lawful justification and with
the intention of damaging them. The plaint which sets forth these facts discloses a
good cause of action, and is sufficient in law. It avers that the Respondents were
damaged in their trade, and in the lawful use of their property, by the order issued
by the Appellant, who, as against them, is thereby a wrong doer, and that such
order was [125] issued intentionally, authoritatively, and with the design of
damaging the Respondents. The judgment, we submit, was well founded upon these
grounds.
First, the damage was the effect of the act of the Appellant; that is quite,clear, and
is sufficiently averred. Now, the great principle of law is, that every man must be
considered to contemplate the probable consequences of his own act, Townend v.
Walker (9 East, 296), Fergusoo v. The Earl of KinIixUI (9 CIL and Fin. 251), or the
act of his agent. Jarmain v. Hooper (6 Man. and Gr. 827), BowIes v. Senior (15
Law J. Q.B. 231), Childers v. WoolUr (29 Law J. Q.B. 129). The damage here was
immediate, and, therefore, actional; it is not, as in the case of a slander, Vicars v.
Wilcocks (2 Smith's L.C. 300; 8 East, 1), too remote. In Parkhur-st v. Foster (1 Ld.
Raym. 480), Lord Holt says, If a man does an unlawful act, he shall be answerable
for the consequences of it, especially where the act is done with intent that con-
sequential damage shall be done.
Secondly, the damage was done to the legal right of the Respondents to prosecute
a lawful trade, namely, the hire and use of their steam tug; and this is prima facie
actionable. .He that hinders another in his trade or livelihood is liable to an action,
else slander affecting a man's trade would not be actionable. Keeble v. Hickeringill
(11 East, 576). And, though no action may lie for a public nuisance, yet if a
private injury is sustained thereby, an action will lie. Iveson v. Moore (1 Ld. Raym.
486), Rose v. Groves (5 Man. and Gr. 613), Wilkes v. Hung eford Market Co. (2
Bingh. N.C. 281), [126] Dobson v. Blaeikmore (16 Law J. Q.B. 233). These authori-
ties show that the law recognizes that description of right in individuals, in respect
of which the special damage is claimed, and that it was actionably wrong to inflict
that sort of damage.
Thirdly, as the damage done flowed from the Appellant's acts, by which he
intended to damage the Respondents in their use of a lawful right, such act was
wrongful on the part of the Appellant, and made him liable to an action. Gregory
v. The Duke of Brunsuick (6 Man. and Gr. 205), Miflar v. Taylor (4 Burr. 2305 ,
Pasley v. Freeman (2 Smith's L.C. 62), Langridge v. Levy (2 Mee. and Wels. 579),
Mostyn v. Fabrigas (1 Smith's L.C. 528), Keeble v. Hfickerinl (11 East, 574). Com.
Dig., tit. action on the case for misfeazance, A. Every loss or damage occasioned
by the wrongful act of another is actionable. Ashby v. White (Ld. Ray. 938, 1
Smith's L.C. 105), Pmrring v. Harris (2 Moo. and Rob. 5), Dean v. Claytos (7 Taunt.
489, 495), Bird v. Holdbrook (4 Bingh. 628), Ferguson v. The Earl of Kinnoull (9
Clk. and Fin. 251, 310, 321). This is not a case of dumnum abs que injuria; if the
Appellant so contends he must make out such position. It is not as where a De-
fendant carrying on an offensive trade, but in a proper manner, and in a proper
place, in pursuance of a previous right acquired, is protected. Rick v. Basterfield
(16 Law J. C.P. 273), Hole v. Barlow (27 Law J. C.P. 207). Nor is this a case where
some other maxim of law comes into play and prevents the Appellant from being
actionable. Revis v. [127] Smik (18 Com. Ben. Rep. 126), Henderson v. Broomhead
(28 Law J. Exch. 360), Barber v. Lessiter (29 Law J. C.P. 161), Lumley v. Gye (2
Ell. and Bla. 216).](ViewImageLocal?handle=hein.slavery/ssactsengr0603&div=1&collection=&method=preview&ext=.png&size=3)