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![handle is hein.slavery/ssactsengr0574 and id is 1 raw text is: 474 DOE V. GREY 1 STARK. 283.
dangerous to a mortgagee whose title to recover might be defeated by instruments
executed between other parties.
It was afterwards proved, that the lost deed had borne the signature of Musgrave,
and upon this the defendant was proceeding to prove the execution of the counter-
part by means of a subscribing witness, but that witness not appearing, the plaintiff
had a verdict.
Scarlett and Owen for the plaintiff.
The Attorney-General and Topping for the defendant.
[Attornies, Burgess and Palmer.]
[283] DOE ON THE DEMISE OF WARTNEY V. GREY.
(Service of notice on the wife of the defendant's attorney at his lodgings, to
produce a lease, on the evening before the trial is insufficient.)
This was an action of ejectment, and the principal question was, whether the
defendant Grey claimed the possession under Marlow, from whom the lessor of the
plaintiff also claimed by virtue of a lease for two hundred years from Marlow to
Allingham, which had been assigned by Alingham to Burley, and by Burley to the
lessor of the plaintiff, Marlow being a party to the two assignments.
In order to warrant the admission of parol evidence of a lease from Marlow to
Grey, the lessor of the plaintiff proved the service of a notice to produce the lease ;
this, it appeared, had been served late the evening before, upon the wife of the
attorney for the defendant at his lodgings.
Lord Ellenborough deeming this notice to be insufficient, it was then proved on
behalf of the plaintiff that the defendant's attorney had that morning in the hall
admitted that he had the lease with him.
Scarlett, for the defendant, objected to the receiving parol evidence on the ground
of this admission, and cited the case of Exall v. Partridge, where Mr. Erskine asked
the witness, whether he had not the lease with him ? the witness said, that [284] he
had it in his pocket, but Lord Kenyon told him that he need not produce it, and that
it was incumbent on the other party to give notice in time in order to give an oppor-
tunity of producing the attesting witness.
Lord Ellenborough was of opinion, that the evidence was inadmissible, the
defendant not having received proper notice.
The lessor of the plaintiff afterwards proving that Marlow was in possession at the
time of the assignment to Allingliam, the plaintiff had a verdict.
The Attorney-General and E. Lawes for the plaintiff.
Scarlett for the defendant.
[Attornies, Wright and Pratt.]
[285] June 1, 1816.
JUDGE V. Cox.
(In an action for negligently keeping a dog, proof that the defendant had warned
a person to beware of the dog lest he should be bitten, is evidence to go to a jury,
of the allegation that the dog was accustomed to bite mankind. Qu. whether
such an allegation be necessary.)
[Referred to, Hartley v. Harriman, 1818, 1 B. & Ald. 620.]
This was an action on the case for keeping a dog, which the defendant (as alleged
in the declaration) knew to be accustomed to bite mankind, and which had severely
bitten the plaintiff's leg.
It appeared, that the defendant, Mrs. Cox, had about six weeks before the accident
happened, taken a ready-furnished house at Harrow, and found the dog upon the
premises, and that she was well aware of his savage disposition, and in consequence
had warned one of the witnesses to take care of the dog lest he should be bitten. The
dog had been attached to a tree by means of a chain and staple, but having by a
sudden exertion broken loose, he inflicted the injury on account of which the action
was brought. It also appeared, that subsequently to this period the dog had bitten
a child, but there was no evidence of any anterior biting.
The Attorney-General contended, that there was no evidence from which the jury
could infer a knowledge on the part of the defendant that the dog had been accus-
tomed to bite mankind, since there was no evidence that it had previously bitten any
human being.](ViewImageLocal?handle=hein.slavery/ssactsengr0574&div=1&collection=&method=preview&ext=.png&size=3)