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![handle is hein.slavery/ssactsengr0363 and id is 1 raw text is: legally authorizes the [764] administration of the goods at Wolverhampton, or
whether there should also be a probate there, is not a matter that affects the question
in this Court. The peculiars contemplated by the canon, and by the authorities
referred to, are not in my opinion royal peculiars, but subordinate peculiars.
It is true-and that is the great argument-that the inconvenience and extra
expense occasioned by royal peculiars are the same which are provided against in th,
case of other peculiars by the prerogative of the archbishop : but that ineonvenien(.
and expense, arising from the necessity of two probates, where there are two indepeu
dent jurisdictions, neither subject to the archbishop, equally exist when there are
goods in Canterbury and York. All peculiars, even royal peculiars, may be of public
inconvenience; but at present they exist lawfully, and possess legal rights which must
be respected. The inconveniences have been pointed out, and are such as call loudly
for a remedy, particularly now that personal property is so extended: but under the
present law I am of opinion that this Court has no right to call in the will, and
compel probate here, because the goods in one or more of the royal peculiars happen,
geographically speaking, to be locally situate within the province.
Another point has been made, viz., that some of the goods are in neither of the
royal jurisdictions, but are in the diocesan jurisdiction of Lichfield and Coventry. In
the first place, that fact is not admitted nor fully established; but assuming that such
is the fact, it follows that the Bridgnorth probate would not reach to those effects : but
does it therefore follow that a prerogative probate is necessary? Would not the
(765] diocesan jurisdiction have a right to grant probate ; and is not the question of
the jurisdiction to which he shall resort rather a matter open to the choice of the
executor? Upon the principle of the case of Scarth v. The Bishop of London's Registrar,
I think there is a concurrency of jurisdiction when a person dies in a foreign juris-
diction (as in York, Scotland, or abroad, and, by analogy, in a royal peculiar) and
leaves goods only in one diocesan jurisdiction, within the province. In that case
either tie diocesan jurisdiction may grant the probate as the goods are there,(a) or
the metropolitan may, because the party did not die within the diocesan jurisdiction ;
but probably that is not a point which the parties are disposed to try, nor is the Court
bound to decide it under the present protest.
The question here is rather between the royal peculiars and the prerogative. The
executors are called upon to bring in the will ; they protest against being bound so
to do. They shew that they have proved the will at Bridgnorth, which is a royal
peculiar and where the party died ; they have therefore taken a proper probate, and
the will is properly deposited. If the deceased left goods in several diocesan juris-
dictions or peculiars, not being royal, so as clearly to require a prerogative probate,
the executors even then could not be called upon to bring.in the will. Probate here
could only be taken upon an office copy or exemplification, as in the case where
probate has been taken in the province of York. I allow the protest and dismiss the
parties.
[766] IN THE GOODS OF JOHN REITZ. Prerogative Court, Mich. Term, By-Day,
1831.-The Court refused to grant administration cum test. ann. to A. B. as the
attorney of the Orphan Board at the Cape of Good Hope acting on behalf of
the next of kin, but subsequently granted it to a creditor, the next of kin having
been cited by a decree on the Royal Exchange.
The deceased, a lieutenant under the command of Captain Owen, R.N., died in
May, 1824, on the coast of Africa, a bachelor, leaving three brothers and a sister, his
next of kin. By his will he gave his property to Miss Stanley, but appointed no
executor nor residuary legatee. Conformably to the laws of the Cape of Good Hope
two of the deceased's next of kin, there resident, placed his affairs under the manage-
ment of the Orphan Board (the president and members of which became officially
executors and administrators of the effects), which, in November, 1825, by power
of attorney authorized Captain Owen (with the concurrence of the next of kin) to
collect the deceased's property ; and after a settlement of his account with his agent,
Mr. Stilwell, to pay over the balance to Miss Stanley. Captain Owen's absence from
England and other circumstances had hitherto prevented his making the present
application. The property was £220.
(a) Gri//ith v. Gri§1th, Sayer, 83, and the cases cited in Scarth v. Bishop of London,
1 Hagg. Ecc. 625.
1337
3 HAGG. ECC. 764.
IN RE REITZ](ViewImageLocal?handle=hein.slavery/ssactsengr0363&div=1&collection=&method=preview&ext=.png&size=3)