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![handle is hein.slavery/ssactsengr0343 and id is 1 raw text is: BRADSHAW V. BRADSHAW
defendant; they will not order the bill to be dismissed. This is not a motion relative
to the contempt itself, and therefore cannot be entertained so long as the contempt
remains.
Mr. Bacon, in reply. The object of the motion is to shew that the defendant
ought not to be compelled to answer; in effect, therefore, his motion does relate to
the contempt. He has discontinued his action, and offers all that the plaintiff could
ask, or the Court could give him by means of a decree. He has, therefore, a right
at once to [71] put an end to this suit: Boyes v. Ford (4 Madd. 40); Praed v. flull
(1 S. & S. 331), Wilmot v. Maccabe (4 Sim. 263), Bishop of Derry v. Tyler.(d)
THE LORD CHIEF BARON. In general it would be most unreasonable and unjust
if the Court, upon mere technical grounds, could not put an end to a suit at the
instance of the parties. But there is a great difficulty in so doing where the party
who makes the application is in contempt. In cases of contempt the Court proceeds
on one general rule. It might in the present case be expedient to deviate from the
general rule ; but, on the other hand, that deviation might lead to greater difficulties.
The motion cannot be entertained in its present shape. The party should have
moved to set aside the attachment upon taking a decree against him, and payment
of costs. Any party may come to set aside an attachment on terms; therefore,
unless some terms can be agreed upon, the motion must be dismissed.
Order by consent; the parties entering into terms.
[72] BRADSHAW V. BRADSHAW. April 22nd, 1836.-Testator devised an estate in
Jamaica to trustees upon trust, so long as Robert B., the second son of his
daughter E. B., should be under the age of twenty-one years, to pay and apply
1501. per annum out of the rents and profits for his maintenance and education,
and subject thereto upon various other trusts, in favour of his daughter E. B.,
and his said grandson Robert B. ; and, subject to all those trusts, in trust for
the said Robert B. for life, with remainder to his first and other sons in tail
male, with remainder in moieties in favour of H. C. and R. C., the second and
third sons of his daughter I. C., and their issue. The testator also devised his
estate in England in trust for his said daughter E. B., for life, with remainder to
his said grandson Robert B. for life, with remainder to his first and other sons in
tail male, with remainder to the third, fourth, fifth, and every other son of the
said E. B., severally and successively in tail male, with remainder to the testator's
right heirs. E. B. had no second son named Robert. The name of her eldest
son was Robert, and that of her second son Henry: Held, under the circum-
stances, that this was a mistake in the name and not in the description of the
devisee; and consequently that Henry, and not Robert, was entitled to take
under these devises; and parol evidence was admitted to explain the ambiguity.
[S. C. 6 L. J. Ex. Eq. 1. Discussed, Doe d. Hiscocks v. Hiscocs, 1839, 5 M. & W. 363.
Applied, Bernasconi v. Atkinson, 1853, 10 Hare, 350. Referred to, Gillett v. Gane,
1870, L. R. 10 Eq. 34; Charter v. Charter, 1874, L. R. 7 H. L. 381. In re Garland;
Garland v. Beverley, 1878, 9 Ch. D. 219. And see 4 Y. & C. Ex. 567.]
(d) In Ch. July, 1834.-The bill in this case prayed that the defendant might be
decreed to deliver up a certain bond to the plaintiff to be cancelled, and that satis-
faction might be decreed to be entered up on the record of the judgment.
An attachment and commission of rebellion having issued against the defendant,
for want of an answer, a motion was made on his behalf that he might be at liberty
to deliver up the bond to the plaintiffs to be cancelled; and that.thereupon, and upon
the defendant's paying the costs of the plaintiffs, and of all other parties to the cause,
and upon his undertaking forthwith, at his own costs and charges, to enter up satis-
faction upon the record of the judgment, the writ of attachment and commission of
rebellion might be discharged, and all further proceedings in this cause might be
stayed.
The motion was opposed on the ground that the defendant was in contempt, and
therefore could not be heard until he had cleared such contempt by putting in his
answer. But his Honour the Vice Chancellor, after argument, overruled the objec-
tion, and made an order in favour of the defendant.
316
2 Y. & 0. E.X. 71.](ViewImageLocal?handle=hein.slavery/ssactsengr0343&div=1&collection=&method=preview&ext=.png&size=3)