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![handle is hein.slavery/ssactsengr0339 and id is 1 raw text is: DE COMAS V. PROST [1865]
This important question can be decided only by the Sovereign as head of the
Established Church and depositary of the ultimate appellate jurisdiction.
Before the Reformation, in a dispute of this nature between two independent
Prelates, an appeal would have lain to the Pope; but all appellate authority of the
Pope over members of the Established Church is by Statute vested in the Crown.
It is the settled prerogative of the Crown, to receive appeals in all Colonial causes,
and by the 25th Hen. VIII., c. 19 (by which the mode of the appeal to the Crown in
Ecclesiastical causes is directed), it is by the 4th section enacted, that for lack of
justice at or in any of the Courts of the Archbishops of this Realm, or in any of the
King's dominions, it shall be lawful to the parties grieved to appeal to the King's
Majesty in the King's Court of Chancery, an enactment which gave rise to the
Commission of Delegates, for which this Tribunal is now substituted.
[157] Unless a controversy, such as that which is presented by this appeal and
petition, falls to be determined by the ultimate jurisdiction of the Crown, it is
plain that there would be a denial of justice, and no remedy for great public in-
convenience and mischief. It is right to add, although unnecessary, that by the
Act, 3rd and 4th Will. IV., c. 41, which constituted this Tribunal, Her Majesty has
power to refer to the Judicial Committee for hearing or consideration any such
other matters whatsoever as Her Majesty shall think fit, and this Committee is
thereupon to hear or consider the same, and to advise Her Majesty thereon; and that
on the 10th of June, 1864, it was ordered by Her Majesty in Council that the petition
and supplemental petition of the Appellant should be, and the same were, thereby
referred to this Committee, to hear the same and report their opinion thereupon to
Her Maj esty.
Their Lordships, therefore, will humbly report to Her Majesty their judgment
and opinion that the proceedings taken by the Bishop of Cape Town, and the judg-
ment or sentence pronounced by him against the Bishop of Natal, are null and void
in law.
[Mews' Dig. tit. COLONY, I. GENERAL PRINCIPLES, 1. III. Appeals to Privy Council, 1;
tit. COURT, A.; tit. CROWN, A.; tit. ECCLESIASTICAL LAW, IV. COLONIAL
CHURCH. S.C. 11 Jur. (N.S.), 353 ; 12 L.T. 188; 13 W.R. 549; see Natal (Bishop
of) v. Gladstone, 1866, L.R. 3 Eq. 2; Ex parte Jenkins, 1868, L.R. 2 P.C.
267; 5 Moo. P.C. (N.S.) 351; Capetown (Bishop of) v. Natal (Bishop of), 1869,
L.R. 3 P.C. 1; 6 Moo. P.C. (N.S.) 203; Merriman v. Williams, 1882, 7 A.C.
503; Read v. Lincoln (Bishop of), 1889, 14 P.D. 128.]
[158] ON APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW SOUTH WALES.
ESTEBAN DE COMAS,- Appellant; JACOBUS CORNELUS PROST and GEORGE
CHARLES ADOLPHUS KOHLER,-Respondents * [March 13, 1865].
Mere advances made by a Factor, whether at the time of his employment as
such, or subsequently, cannot have the effect of altering the revocable
nature of an authority to sell, unless the advances are accompanied by an
agreement that the authority shall not be revocable [3 Moo. P.C. (N.S.)
179].
Whether such an agreement has been made, or may be properly inferred, is a
question upon the evidence for the jury [3 Moo. P.C. (N.S.) 177, 180].
So held in an action for damages for an alleged improper sale by the Defend-
ants of certain sugars placed in their hands by the Plaintiff.
The Judge directed the jury that, by the mere relationship of Factor, the Factor
did not by making advances, acquire any right in derogation of the rights
of his principal to give directions as to the time and manner of sale, and
that any such right on the part of the Factor must be made out by an
agreement which might be inferred from the evidence, or might be im-
plied by the proof of usage. Held that there was no misdirection [3 Moo.
P.C. (N.S.) 179].
Present: Lord Kingsdown, Sir Edward Ryan, and Sir Edward Vaughan
Williams.
III MOORE N.S., 157](ViewImageLocal?handle=hein.slavery/ssactsengr0339&div=1&collection=&method=preview&ext=.png&size=3)