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![handle is hein.slavery/ssactsengr0329 and id is 1 raw text is: other creditors. But I think that we are bound by the decision of the Lord Chanellor
in that case. Here no creditor can obtain the composition money unless he signs the
deed. That is not what the statute intended. The statute intended that all the
creditors should be in the same position whether they signed the deed or not. Here
those creditors who sign the deed, and those who do not are in a different position ;
and I think that, on that ground, the deed is void, and the plaintiff is entitled to
judgment.
MARTIN, B. I am also of opinion that the plaintiff is entitled to judgment. It
has been argued on the part of the defendant that the words payable on signing the
deed, mean on the signature of the debtor; but we could notput that construction
upon them without doing violence to the language, and reading the words in a-sense
quite different from that which they express. The deed seems to me clearly to
express that each creditor is to sign the deed, and that upon his signing it he is to be
paid the composition, so that the signature by each creditor is a condition precedent
to his right to receive the composition money. In the case of Ex pare Cockburn
(33 L. J. Bank. 19) the Lord Chancellor said : To render a deed of composition and
release binding on the minority of the creditors who have not executed or assented
to or approved of it in writing, it is necessary that the non-assenting creditors should
(638] stand under the deed in the same situation and with the same advantages as
the creditors forming the majority. In another judgment in that case the Lord
Chancellor said (33 L. J. Bank. 22) : As I explained on a former occasion, in my
view of the statute a deed to bind creditors who have not executed it must be a deed
which places the parties who execute and the parties who have not executed it pre-
cisely upon an equal footing in point of law. That is not so with this deed. In
common and ordinary justice creditors who assent should not be placed in a better
position than those who dissent. Here creditors who do not sign the deed get nothing.
That is the plain and direct provision of the deed. I think that, upon the authority
of ilderton v. Jewell (16 C. B. N. S. 142) this plea is bad, and that the plaintiff is
entitled to judgment.
BRABMWELL, B. I am of the same opinion. It is sufficient to say that I think the
case of Ildertom v. Jewell is in point; but I cannot help remarking that the law on
this subject is in a very unsatisfactory state. It should be remembered, however,
that Courts of law have to deal with cases of the worst aspect, and know nothing of
the numerous cases in which the provisions of these deeds are successfully worked
out without recourse to litigation.
PiGoTT, B. I am of the same opinion. I think this deed is a very crude docu-
ment, to say the least of it. Probably the debtor himself did not know whether it
was intended to include all his creditors, or not. But, upon reading the deed, it is
clear that according to its true construction a creditor can only get the composition
on signing the deed. The case is therefore within the authority of Ilderton v. Jewell
(16 C. B. N. S. 142). It is unpleasant to give judgment upon [639] a mere technical
point of law without regard to the merits of the case, and it is desirable that the
legislature should pass a short Act embodying a form of deed to be used on all
occasions, so as to put an end to these much-vexed questions.
Judgment for the plaintiff.
SALOMONS v. PENDER. April 21, 1865.-An agent, employed to sell land, sold it to
a Company in which he was interested as' a shareholder and director. Held,
that he was entitled to no commission from his employer in respect of the sale.
[S. C. 34 L. J. Ex. 95; 11 Jur. (N. S.) 432 ; 13 W. R. 637; 12 L. T. 267. Observa-
tions adopted, Tetley v. Shand, 1871, 20 W. R. 206; 25 L. T. 658. Referred to,
Robinson v. Mollett, 1875, L. R. 7 H. L. 829. Applied, Andrew v. Ramsay, [1903]
2 K. B. 635; Stubbs v. Slater, [1910] 1 Ch. 195.]
Declaration for work and labour, commission, and on accounts stated.
Plea. Never indebted* Issue thereon.
At the trial, before Martin, B., at the Londdn Sittings after last Hilary Term, it
appeared that the plaintiff was a surveyor and land agent, and brought this action to
recover the sum of 4561. 10s., as commission upon the sale of certain land of the
defendant. The plaintiff, in his evidence, stated that in the Spring of 1863 he was
68'2
SAMOMONS V. PENDER
3- H. & C. 638.](ViewImageLocal?handle=hein.slavery/ssactsengr0329&div=1&collection=&method=preview&ext=.png&size=3)