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![handle is hein.slavery/ssactsengr0328 and id is 1 raw text is: SCOTT V. LORD SEYMOUR
POLLOCK, C. B. I am of opinion that the rule ought to be discharged. Any
person reading this promissory note would come to the conclusion that there is
nothing on the face of it to exempt from personal liability any of the parties who have
signed it. The signature of the secretary is not different in form from that of the
directors; and all the persons whose names appear upon the note have signed it in
their individual capacity. The case of Bull v. Morrell (12 A. & E. 745) turned
mainly on the fact that the jury found that the manager did not sign the bill as
acceptor, but merely put his name on it as an officer of the Company. This rule was
granted rather from the circumstance of the point having been reserved than from
any doubt we entertained about it.
BRAMWELL, B. I am also of opinion that the rule ought to be discharged. The
only evidence, other than the note, [217] was, first, that the plaintiff lent his money
to the Society, and, secondly, that the Society was governed by certain rules, which
are obviously only binding on the members inter se. Though the directors may have
given the note as a security for money lent to the Society, in considering whether theyare
individually liable we must decide upon what appears on the face of the instrument.
Now, we have the authority of Price v. Taylor (5 H. & N. 540) that a note signed in
this way binds the directors. Then the case is reduced to this, is not the defendant
equally bound ? It is true that he is secretary; but they are directors, and that does
not prevent them from being personally liable. Suppose the words directors and
secretary had been left out of the note, could there have been any difficulty?
None whatever. But it is said that the addition of the word secretary exempts
the defendant from liability. I cannot think that the circumstances of the defendant
adding secretary to his name makes any difference.
This case is distinguishable from Bult v. Morrell (12 A. & E. 745). There the bill
was addressed to the directors of the Company, and therefore the drawees were the
directors. The three directors who accepted it treated it as a bill addressed to the
Company, and they state that they accepted it for the Company, so that they
accepted per procuration. The defendant Parker, not being a director, was not a
drawee, and therefore he did not make himself liable as acceptor by putting his name
on the bill. In Lindus v. Melrose (3 H. & N. 177) the point decided was not whether,
some of the parties who signed the note being personally liable, others were also
liable, but whether any of them were liable. Price v. Taylor is a distinct authority
that the two directors who signed this note are personally liable ; then is there any
reason why the [218] defendant should not also be liable? It is possible that he did
not mean to make himself personally responsible; on the other hand, it is probable that
he had no objection to sign his name as an additional security to the plaintiff; but
however that may be, he has made himself personally liable by the mode in which he.
has signed the note.
CHANNELL, B. I am also of opinion that the rule ought to be discharged.
Looking at the evidence apart from the note itself, I am of opinion that the defendant
is liable. The plaintiff is a stranger to the Society, and it may well be that he was
content to lend his money upon getting the security of the secretary as well as the
directors. Then, looking at the note itself, is there anything with reference to the
signature, or the part of the note in which it is found, to exclude a personal liability ?
I think not. The defendant has signed the note in such a way as to make himself
jointly and severally liable with the two other persons who signed it. This case is
distinguishable from Bult v. Morrell, for there the question was whether Parker, the
manager of the Company, was jointly liable with the directors as an acceptor of the
bill, and the jury found that he did not sign his name as acceptor, but only as an
officer of the Company.
Rule discharged.
[219] SCOTT v. LORD SEYMOUR. May 28, 1862.-A British subject may maintain,
in the Courts of this country, an action against another British subject for an
assault committed in a foreign country, notwithstanding proceedings have been
taken at his instance, and are pending, in a Court of that country in respect of
the same assault and battery.-To an action for assault and false imprisonment the
defendant pleaded :-First: (except as to the imprisonment), that the trespasses
were committed at Naples, and that the plaintiff and defendant resided there and
Ex. Div. xiv.-28
I H. & C. 217.](ViewImageLocal?handle=hein.slavery/ssactsengr0328&div=1&collection=&method=preview&ext=.png&size=3)