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![handle is hein.slavery/ssactsengr0318 and id is 1 raw text is: having been at the time of the accident within a place where regulations for other
lights for ships are legally established. And the bye-laws, which regulate ships in
this place, although they require steamships to carry a light, do not impose that
obligation upon sailing vessels. The bye-law takes the place of the Admiralty regula-
tions. [Parke, B. The Admiralty regulations require all sailing vessels, whether at
anchor or sailing, to carry a light; and they are bound to carry the light prescribed,
unless there be some local regulations specifying a different kind of light for all
ships, whether steamers or sailing vessels.] It could hardly have been intended
that the local regulations should apply to one set of vessels, and that the Admiralty
regulations should apply to another.
Secondly. Notwithstanding the plaintiff may have been guilty of disobeying the
Admiralty regulations, still, inasmuch as the defendants were clearly guilty of gross
negligence, the Court would le justified in departing from the general rule laid down
by the 28th section of the Act, which precludes the injured party, who has been
guilty of a breach of the rules, from recovering compensation for his loss.
Cur. adv. vult.
POLLOCK, C. B., now said-In this case, which was tried before me, and in which
there was a verdict for the de-[738]-fendants, Mr. Watson moved for a rule nisi for
a new trial, on the ground of misdirection.
We have considered the Admiralty regulations, which are distinctly directed to
two objects: first, to steam-vessels, and secondly, to sailing vessels; and we are all
of opinion, that the meaning of these regulations very clearly is, that every sailing
vessel lying at anchor, either in a roadstead or the fairway of a river, shall have
a bright light at the masthead, unless there be some provision provided for by local
enactment for a different sort of light to be borne by that description of vessel. We
are of opinion that the intention of the legislature was, that unless some other sort
of light be ordered by local regulations, the vessel must put up the light provided for
by the regulations of the Admiralty. The Court concur with me in thinking that
the true points were put to the jury, and consequently that my direction upon that
subject was quite right. The point I left to the jury involved the question whether
the plaintiff himself did not contribute to the accident by his own carelessness. We
are clearly of opinion that no change in the law has been effected by this regulation
of the Admiralty ; but that persons in navigating their vessels are still bound to keep
a look out, just as they were before these regulations were made; and if it could be
clearly made out that a vessel having no light had been run down by another, from
sheer carelessness and negligence in not keeping a good look out, we agree with
Mr. Watson in thinking that in such a case the plaintiff would have had a right to
compensation from the defendants. But here the case was one for the jury, and we
think they have correctly found that the defendants' vessel was in a part of the stream
where she had a right to be, and that the accident arose from the plaintiff's own
negligence. The point was therefore left to them substantially involving the law as
it stood before the statute, and still is, namely, that if the conduct of the party [739]
complaining has either occasioned the loss or has contributed to the occasioning the
loss, then he can no more recover now than he could have done before the Act of
Parliament was passed and these regulations were made. We therefore are of opinion
that, in this case, there ought to be no rule.
Rule refused.(a)
NAYLOR AND OTHERS V. PALMER AND ANOTHER. May 7, 1853.-To a declaration
on a policy of assurance on advances for the transport of Chinese emigrants from
China to Peru, for their outfit and provisions, to be paid on the arrival of the
emigrants at the port of destination, the perils insured against being pirates,
rovers, thieves, &c., barratry of the master and mariners, and all other perils,
losses, and misfortunes, &c. (in the usual form) ; the declaration alleging a total
loss by the emigrants piratically and feloniously murdering the captain and part
of the crew, and feloniously stealing and carrying away the ship; the defendants
pleaded, first, that as soon as the emigrants had committed the murder, and had
obtained possession of the vessel, they steered for the nearest land, for the purpose
(a) See General Steam Navigation Company v. Monison, 13 C. B. 581.
1550
NAYLOR V. PALMER
8 EX. 738.](ViewImageLocal?handle=hein.slavery/ssactsengr0318&div=1&collection=&method=preview&ext=.png&size=3)