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![handle is hein.slavery/ssactsengr0306 and id is 1 raw text is: deal on credit for the purpose of carrying on their business. I think, therefore, the
defendant has not raised a sufficient foundation to support the second objection.
Being a shareholder, it was competent to him to have produced the deed of settlement
whereby the members were mutually bound, if it were material to his defence. I
should have left it to the jury to judge for themselves whether such companies do not
ordinarily deal on credit; if they do, the shareholders are liable, unless by some
evidence the party shews that in the particular case he is not liable.
PARKE, B. No doubt the plaintiff is bound to make out his case: the only question
is, whether he has not here proved a primh facie case; if he has, the jury had a right
to consider it, no answer being given on the part of the defendant. The sole question
was, whether there was evidence to go to the jury, that the defendant gave authority
to the directors to pledge his credit to the plaintiff. If the case had stood merely on
the fact of his being a shareholder, I should have thought it was not sufficient. But
his letters, which were put in, shewed, first, that he knew the directors were acting
in the management of the partnership; and, secondly, that he was taking a personal
interest in the concern : and they were evidence for 1466] the jury that he authorized
the directors to do what they did, for his benefit. It is said that be was deceived as
to the amount of capital : but whether he knew the amount actually subscribed or
not, there was proof that he authorized the directors to proceed in the management
of the concern. Either he knew it, or, not knowing it, chose to authorize the directors
to proceed. No point was made at the trial that this was such a partnership as could
not deal on credit; if it had, the plaintiff would probably have supplied evidence on
that point; and a Cornish jury would probably have said it was the constant practice
to purchase materials for mines on credit: at all events, the objection was not taken.
There was, therefore, a sufficient primh facie case for the jury. If the defendant had
shewn, that by this particular contract the directors were only to deal with the actual
fund put into their hands, and that they had no power to pledge the credit of the
shareholders, that would have been a defence, because the plaintiff has not trusted to
any representation of the defendant, or bargained personally with him. But the sole
question being, whether there was a prim& facie case for the jury, I think the two
letters of the defendant, and the fact of his being a shareholder, in the absence of
proof of any limited agreement on his part, constituted such prim& facie case, and
therefore that there ought to be no rule.
ALDERSON, B. concurred.
ROLFE, B. I am of the same opinion. The goods supplied by the plaintiff were
of daily use in the mine; they were habitually furnished, to the amount of £820;
the accounts were regularly sent up to town and audited, and this was only the balance
of the last invoice on the books. It is clear what was the usual mode of dealing here,
and if it had been put to the jury, there can be no doubt what their finding would
have been.
Rule refused.
[467] LAMB v. VICE AND FOUR OTHERS. Excb. of Pleas. 1840.-An officer of
the Palace Court entered into a bond, with sureties, to the knight marshal of that
Court, conditioned for the due performance of the duties of his office ; and (inter
alia) that he should take sufficient bail from all defendants arrested, and should
obey the lawful orders of the Court. Having taken insufficient bail from a
defendant arrested in an action in that Court, an order was made requiring him
to pay the amount of debt and costs in the action, which he disobeyed :-Held,
that the knight marshal was entitled, as a trustee for the plaintiff in the action,
to recover, in an action on the bond, the full amount of the debt and costs.
[S. C. 8 Dowl. P. C. 360; 9 L. J. Ex. 177 ; 4 Jur. 341. Applied, Pugh v. Stringfield,
1858, 4 C. B. (N. S.) 369 ; Lloyd's v. Harper, 1880, 16 Ch. D. 309 ; In re Flavell;
Murray v. Flavell, 1883, 25 Ch. D. 97.]
Debt on bond, in the penal sum of £500. The declaration set out the condition
of the bond, whereby, (after reciting that the defendant John Vice was admitted by
the plaintiff, knight marshal and one of the judges of the Court of the King's Palace
of Westminster, to be one of the bearers of the virges of the household of our sovereign
lord the then King, and one of the officers and ministers of the Court of our sovereign
495
6 X. & W. 466.
LAMB V. VICE](ViewImageLocal?handle=hein.slavery/ssactsengr0306&div=1&collection=&method=preview&ext=.png&size=3)