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![handle is hein.slavery/ssactsengr0304 and id is 1 raw text is: ground that they form an additional part of the value of the goods, in which the party
has already an interest. Thus, the owner of goods on board a vessel may insure the
profits to arise from them. So may a consignee, or a factor in respect of his com-
mission. So may captors, because they have a lawful possession, coupled with a well-
founded expectation that their claim to retain the goods will be allowed. So may
(233] the owners of slaves, or a captain in respect of his commission. In these cases
there is either an absolute or a special property in possession. There the profits are
insured as an additional value upon the goods, in which the insurer has a present
interest. Here, however, the assured are not interested at the time of the goods
being put on board, but only upon their arrival. They rely upon the honour of the
vendor, that the goods shall be put on board the ship specified in the contract, and
that they shall be delivered to them when the ship arrives. It is an engagement of
honour merely. If it is not a contract capable of being enforced at law, it is nothing.
The contract is to sell the goods when they arrive, but there was no memorandum in
writing, and consequently no contract which was capable of being enforced, at the
time either of the insurance or the loss ; and if it ultimately did become capable of
being enforced, that was only by the subsequent part delivery and acceptance, which
was after the loss had occurred. At the time of the insurance and of the loss, there
was merely an expectation of possession on the part of the plaintiffs, founded on the
mere promise of the vendors, but there was a total absence of interest in the subject-
matter of the insurance. There was no contract which could be enforced, but a mere
promise on the part of Messrs. Harrison & Co. to deliver the oil when it arrived.
There was no interest whatever, either special or general, in the cargo. The defen-
dant is, therefore, entitled to a verdict on the third plea.
ALDERSON, B. I agree with the rest of the Court in thinking that the plaintiffs
had no insurable interest in the cargo of the ship Maria. The contract of the
plaintiffs with Harrison & Co. was a mere verbal contract, incapable of being enforced.
GURNEY, B., concurred.
Rule absolute.
[234] PIM AND OTHERS V. CURELL AND OTHERS. Exch. of Pleas. 1840.-A
declaration in case for the infringement of a ferry, described the ferry as being
across the river Mersey, from the township, parish, chapelry, or place of
Birkenhead, in the county of Chester, to the parish, township, or place of Liver-
pool, in the county of Lancaster: -Held, 1st, that the plaintiff might recover
under this declaration, although he proved a ferry both ways, as well from L. to
B., as from B. to L. ; 2ndly, that this description did not import a ferry from
the whole township, &c., of B., to the whole parish, &c., of L., but that the
plaintiff might recover on proof of a ferry from any point within 13. to L.-Under
a lease of a ferry, describing it as a ferry across a river both ways, a ferry across
the river one way only will pass.-Semble, that the establishment of a ferry
across the river Mersey, having its terminus in Birkenhead, within 400 yards of
the plaintiffs' ferry, and upon which the defendants carried passengers and goods
for hire iq boats from Birkenhead to Liverpool, in itself imported an infringement
of the plaintiffs' ferry, for which they might maintain an action.-The plaintiffs
derived title to their ferry.under a grant from Edward III. to the priory, of
Bi-kenhead. The defendants, in disproof of this title, sought to shew that there
was a pre-existing ferry from Liverpool to Birkenhead, and from Birkenhead to
Liverpool, which rendered the grant of Edward III. void as a grant of ferry.
In order to shew that both were ferries one way only, the plaintiffs' from B. to L.,
and the other from L. to B., the plaintiffs gave in evidence certain proceedings
in the Court of Chancery of the Duchy of Lancaster, temp. Chas. I., on an infor-
mation filed at the relation of the then lessee of the latter ferry under the crown,
Sir W. Molyneux, against the proprietor of the former, a Mr. Powell. The
information claimed a ferry both ways, and sought to restrain the defendant from
proceeding in certain suits in the Court of Requests at Westminster in disturb-
ance of the right of the relator, and prayed process against the defendant to
appear in the Duchy Court to answer the premises, and abide the order of the
Court. Before answer, the Court made an order, purporting to be in explana.
tion of an injunction against the defendant to permit the relator peaceably to
6 X. &. W. 233.
PIM V. CURELL
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