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![handle is hein.slavery/ssactsengr0291 and id is 1 raw text is: ROBERTS V. BRETT
the key-note to all the subsequent decisions which held that the prima facie liability
of an occupier no longer existed when it was shewn that the profits connected with
his occupation were applicable to public purposes. Lord Kenyon, in founding his
judgment upon The Kng v. St. Luke's Hospital, 2 Burr. 1053, must have intended to
decide that, in the case before him, there was no beneficial occupier, although he did
not advert to the distinction [146] that, in the case of St. Luke's, there was nothing
received by any one by reason of the occupation, while the commissioners of the
Salter's Load Sluice were impowered to take tolls for the navigation which was
vested in them. The exemption of an occupier whose occupation is applicable to
public purposes was thus almost identically introduced; and, having been so, it was
accepted without much consideration in the subsequent cases.
At last, some decisions having taken place which were hard to be reconciled with
each other, it became necessary to define with some precision the true principle which
ought to govern cases of this description. The distinction was then proposed between
general and local public purposes. The difficulty, not to say the impossibility, of
reconciling the cases by a distinction of this sort has been already shewn. If, as
before observed, the ability of the occupier means the personal benefit derived from
his occupation, it is as much excluded where the profits of his occupation are applic-
able to limited public purposes, as where they are to be applied to the benefit of the
public at large. I am of opinion that, under the words of the 43 Eliz. c. 2, every
occupier of a tenement yielding profit is within the rating clause of the statute,
although the tenement be a public work for the general good of the realm, and the
profit be directed to be applied exclusively to its maintenance.
Having thus expressed my opinion that the Mersey Docks and Harbour Board are
liable to be rated for the Liverpool as well as for the Birkenhead Docks, it is unneces-
sary to consider the effect of the different acts of parliament by which the trustees were
expressly made liable to parochial rates in respect of warehouses to be built, in like
manner as the same are or would be payable in respect of warehouses the occupation
of (147] which is beneficial. The provisions of these acts certainly appear to indicate
the opinion of the legislature, that, without them, the warehouses would have been
exempt from liability to poor-rate, as part of the docks enjoying that exemption.
But, if this liability existed before, the acts cannot have the effect of taking it away
(not by express enactment, but) by mere implication. It is quite true, as Byles, J.,
has said, that, the act of 20 & 21 Viet. c. clxii. having consolidated the docks at
Liverpool and Birkenhead into one estate, and vested the control of them in one
public trust, it would be singular if one portion of the property should be rateable and
one not rateable, under precisely similar circumstances. This undoubtedly would be
the result, if the decisions of the two cases appealed against were to stand. And the
remark exhibits in a striking manner the impossibility of reconciling the decisions
which, on the one hand, have exempted the Liverpool Docks from liability to poor-
rate, and, on the other, have rendered the Birkenhead Docks liable to it.
By reversing the judgment in the case of the Liverpool Docks (Jones v. The
Mersey Docks and Harbour Board), and by affirming the judgment in that of the
Birkenhead Docks (The Mersey Docks and Harbour Board v. Cameron), the decisions will
at last be brought into uniformity, and the statute 43 Eliz. c. 2, will, in my opinion,
receive its proper construction, and have its consistent effect and operation.
LORD KINGSDOWN. My Lords,-I concur with my noble and learned friends in
the opinions they have expressed.
Judgment in The Mersey Docks and Harbour Board v. Cameron affirmed.
Judgment in Jones v. The Mersey Docks and Harbour Board reversed.
[148] [IN THE HOUSE OF LORDS.]
ROBERTS V. BRETT. March 16th, 1865.
[S. C. 11 H. L. C. 337; 11 E. R. 1363 (with note).]
By an indenture of the 15th of May, 1855, the plaintiff covenanted that he would
forthwith, at his own expense, procure a suitable vessel, and stow on board a certain
telegraphic cable then at Morden's Wharf, and would rig, fit out, &c., the said ship,
1060
20 C. B. (Nq. 8.) 146.](ViewImageLocal?handle=hein.slavery/ssactsengr0291&div=1&collection=&method=preview&ext=.png&size=3)