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![handle is hein.slavery/ssactsengr0282 and id is 1 raw text is: BERNSTEIN V. BAXENDALE
erroneous. I see no evidence whatever of a contract. It is said that a contract need
not be express, but may be implied from the surrounding circumstances. That, no
doubt, is so in many cases : but there are no surrounding circumstances here to warrant
any such inference as the judge has drawn. What are the facts? The company is
formed for the purpose of supplying the town and neighbourhood with gas. The
respondent, being desirous of having his premises lighted and warmed with gas,
adapts them for its reception by the putting up of stoves and fittings, and hires from
the company a meter for the purpose of measuring the quantity consumed. I see
nothing that was to bind the respondent to take gas for a single minute longer than
he was minded so to do. If there be no implication of a contract on his part to take,
so neither could there be any implication of a contract on the part of the company to
continue the supply for any definite time. I am fully alive to the arguments of [249]
inconvenience which have been suggested by Mr. Baylis: but the same sort of argu-
ment would equally be applicable to an infinite variety of articles besides gas, which
the comfort and convenience of life render necessary to the consumer. It is altogether
a question of degree. We cannot imply a contract from the accidental circumstance
of this company having a monopoly of the supply of gas to this neighbourhood. I see
nothing whatever to bind either the one party to take or the other to furnish the
supply any longer than their convenience, or their caprice, if you will, may induce
them to take or to supply.
CROWDER, J. I also think that the judge was wrong in telling the jury that there
was evidence from which they might imply a contract for the supply of gas until some
notice was given to determine it. Where a gas-company is incorporated by an act of
parliament, there is usually an express obligation imposed upon it to continue the
supply until a certain notice is given. But this is not a company so incorporated. It
happens that this company are the sole manufacturers of gas in the town in question:
and we are called upon thence to infer an obligation or a contract to supply. I see
no ground whatever for any such inference. The judge ought not to have nonsuited
the plaintiff.
WILLES, J. I am of the same opinion. I cannot see how any contract to continue
the supply of gas generally, or until notice, can be inferred from the circumstances
stated in this case. If at any point of time a contract could be implied, it would be
implied from the fact of the respondent having incurred the expense of putting up
the gas-fittings and stoves. I apprehend nobody could doubt that it was perfectly
competent to the company to decline to commence to supply the [250] respondent
with gas. Having commenced it, was there any implied contract to continue it
If there was, for what time was it to endure ? If for a quarter of a year or a year,
it is manifest that the consumer would not have an equivalent for the expense
he had incurred at the outset. The only reasonable contract that could be implied
would be, to continue the supply so long as the fittings should last, or until the con-
sumer had had a sufficient enjoyment thereof to repay him for the expense thereof.
What a complicated sort of contract that would be to imply for the parties! And yet
it is the only one that could be implied. Seeing that there is this difficulty, the only
conclusion I can come to is that there is no contract at all, except that the supply is to
be determined at the will and pleasure of either party. The circumstance of the
meter being hired at a yearly rent, and of the gas-accounts having always been paid
quarterly, amounts to nothing. I have already referred to a case (Huffell v. A'mistead)
to shew, that, in the case of a tenancy, the mere fact of the payments having been
made weekly will not warrant the inference of a contract for a week's notice to quit.
If even the respondent was entitled to reasonable notice, he is put out of court by the
notice which was served upon him before the end of the quarter.
BYLES, J. I am of the same opinion. I can add nothing to what has been said
by my Lord and my two learned Brothers.
Judgment of nonsuit.
[251] BERNSTEIN v. BAXENDALE AND OTHERS. April 16th, 1859.
[S. C. 28 L. J. C. P. 265; 5 Jur. N. S. 1056; 7 W. R. 396.]
It is impossible with precise accuracy to define what are trinkets within the mean-
ing of the 1st section of the Carriers' Act, 11 G. 4 & 1 W. 4, c. 68.-But, semble
6 0. 8. (N. S.) 249.](ViewImageLocal?handle=hein.slavery/ssactsengr0282&div=1&collection=&method=preview&ext=.png&size=3)