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![handle is hein.slavery/ssactsengr0235 and id is 1 raw text is: GUEST V. WILLASEY
be objected to, and that would not include a letter of attorney. Factum dicitur
scriptum solenne quo firmatur donum, concessio, pactum, contractus, et hujusmodi,
alias charta. Donum, concessio, pactum, contractus, all imply instruments conveying
an interest, to which kind of instruments alone hujusmodi can refer, and therefore
does not include a power. With respect to the remaining part of the passage, Est
vel simplex vel indentatum; hoc ubi plures, illud ubi solus quispiam agit, agit can
only apply to the conveyance of an interest, and not to the granting of a power. All
the instruments specified on the part of the crown as being instances of deeds con-
taining no contract, are, at all events, instruments conveying an interest, and so fall
within Spelman's definition; as a release, a confirmation, deed to lead uses, dis-
claimer, &c. And when Lord Coke says that literm do sometimes mean a deed, he
means merely an instrument framed with the usual formalities attending a deed; it
is to these only that he refers, when he says that there are but three things requisite
to constitute a deed; writing, sealing, and delivering being merely ceremonies to
authenticate a contract or grant. The case in the year books was only cited to shew
that it was there esteemed doubtful [428] whether a letter of attorney could be
pleaded as a deed, but in the judgment of the learned compiler of the edition, the
result of the casewas, as expressed in the table to the year book, that a letter of
attorney was not a deed, ut videtur ; and Broke states the case thus: Le brief fuit,
diversa facta et munimenta, et le count fuit de un fait de feoffment et un lettre
d'attorney ; et ideo optima opinio que le count abattera par ce que n'est guarr: per
le brief. With regard to the covenant contained in the power of attorney, it was
not a contract on which any action could lie, but to prevent circuity of action might
be pleaded as a release. Ayliff v. Scrimsheire (1 Show. 46), Hodges v. Smith (Cro. Eliz.
623), 1 T. R. 446 (c). Then with regard to the statutes, the position that affirmative
words in a subsequent statute do not take away the effect of affirmative words in a
prior, applied only to statutes in par materil; and in addition to the instances which
had been given, in which the legislature had uniformly made a distinction between
deeds and letters of attorney, the various stamp acts might also be referred to, in
which deeds and letters of attorney for the transfer of stock, &c. were placed under
different classes, and different duties were made payable for each of them.
The Judges expressed no opinion publicly, but the prisoner was executed.
End of Michaelmas Term.
[429] CASES ARGUED AND DETERMINED IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS, AND
OTHER COURTS, IN HILARY TERM, IN THE FIFTH AND SIXTH YEARS OF THE
REIGN OF GEORGE IV.
GUEST AND ANOTHER V. JAMES WILLASEY, an Infant, MARY J. WILLASEY, SARAH
C. WILLASEY, WILLIAM WILLASEY, EDWARD WILLASEY, MARIA RUTH
WILLASEY, ALICIA WILLASEY, also Infants, AND N. SALISBURY AND A.
GARNETT. 1825.
[S. C. 10 Moore, 223; 3 L. J. C. P. (0. S.) 14. Applied, Hamilton v. Carroll, 1839,
1 Ir. Eq. R. 178. Discussed, Allen v. Maddock, 1858, 11 Moo. P. C. 447. Referred
to, In the Goods of Spotten, 1880, 5 L. R. Ir. 405. For subsequent proceedings see
3 Bing. 614.]
Three codicils of different dates indorsed on the back of a will. The two first referred
to lands mentioned in the will, made a disposition of lands purchased subsequently
to the will, according to directions in the will as to the devisor's lands in general,
and appointed new executors, but were attested by only two witnesses each. The
third only appointed a new executor in the room of an executor named in the
second codicil, but was attested by three witnesses :-Held, that the third codicil
was a republication of the second and of the will, and that the land acquired
subsequently to the will passed according to a disposition made in the will as to the
devisor's land in general.
This cause came on to be heard before the Master of the Rolls on the 13th of
(c) Per Buller J. in Smith v. Mapleback.
2 BING. 428.](ViewImageLocal?handle=hein.slavery/ssactsengr0235&div=1&collection=&method=preview&ext=.png&size=3)