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![handle is hein.slavery/ssactsengr0206 and id is 1 raw text is: M 'TURK V. BENT [1843]
prejudice to the question in a ease where neither Plaintiff nor Defendant knew the
fact of interest in the witness; so that it is clear that Lord Eldon was not laying
down any general rule which, might not bend to particular circumstances. Their
Lordships will go so far as to admit this; that, as a general rule, it is manifestly
objectionable to re-examine a witness after a release of that which would have been a
valid objection to his competency; for a man who once has sworn with a really
operative bias cannot be said to be free to speak the truth after the release; and
though the bias which may have induced him to swear in the first instance has been
removed, another bias has arisen, namely, the necessity which he may feel, of making
Iis second testimony square with his first. For this reason their Lordships are of
[212] opinion, that, in such a case, it would be extremely inconvenient to allow a
re-examination; and so the Judge of the Court below said, he could not allow the
practice to prevail as a general rule; meaning, unless some peculiar circum-
stances in the case shall justify the application. Their Lordships adopt that view of
the law, and see no reason to doubt, that, in every case of this description, the circum-
stances and the nature of the objection as to the interest of a witness, must be
considered. It is purely a technical objection, and no reason appears for not allowing
this witness to be re-examined; there being therefore no suspicion beforehand as to
the objection on the ground of interest, there is no reason to suspect what Lord Eldon,
in the case before him, thought, namely, that the party examining the witness was
cognizant of the objection at the time of such examination, and did not remove it,
but laid by until the other side discovered the objection. We see no. ground for
altering the order of the Court below, and, therefore, dismiss the appeal with costs.
[Mews' Dig. tit. COLONY, III. API'EALS TO PRIVY COUNCIL, 5. Principles on which
Privy Council acts. S.C. 7 Jur. 161. See 6 and 7 Vict. c. 85.]
[213] ON APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF CIVIL JUSTICE OF
BRITISH GUIANA.
MICHAEL McTURK and PETER ROSE,-Appellants; JOHN BENT,-Respondent *
[Feb. 18, 1843].
In an action brought in the Supreme Court of British Guiana, the Plaintiff
obtained an interdict restraining the Defendants, the managers of a planta-
tion, from selling or consigning any portion of the proceeds of the plantation.
This interdict remained in force until the cause came on for hearing (ten
months afterwards,) when the Court discharged the interdict as having been
obtained per sub et obreptionenz, and condemned the Plaintiff to make good
to the Defendants all losses, costs and damages by them already had and
suffered, or yet to be had and suffered in consequence. An Appeal was
entered against this Decree, but not prosecuted. The Defendants to the
previous action then brought an action in the same Court to assess the losses,
costs, and damages incurred by reason of the interdict. Evidence was given of
certain damages sustained in consequence of the interdict, which was not
contradicted. The Court rejected the claim in toto. Held by the Judicial
Committee on Appeal,-
1st. That the Decree of discharging the interdict must be presumed to have been
conformable to the law of Holland prevailing in British Guiana.
2nd. That that Decree must be taken as a simultaneous Decree discharging the
interdict, and pronouncing for damages. And,
3rd. That the Court below was wrong in rejecting the claim in toto, there being
evidence of damages sustained by the interdict. And remitted the cause to
the Court below to assess the damages incurred.
Present: Lord Brougham, Lord Campbell, Mr. Baron Parke, Mr. Justice Erskine,
and the Right Honourable Dr. Lushington.
283
IV MOORE, 212](ViewImageLocal?handle=hein.slavery/ssactsengr0206&div=1&collection=&method=preview&ext=.png&size=3)