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![handle is hein.slavery/ssactsengr0191 and id is 1 raw text is: was properly or improperly lighted, but the question is, whether fire occasioned the
damage. If any other criterion be taken, it would in many cases of policies against
fire introduce nice and intricate questions. It cannot be necessary that the fire, to
produce a loss within the policy, should be only such fire as is communicated to some
substance not contained in the intended and proper receptacle of fire. Heat may be so
intense, as to ignite combustibles without the actual contact of flame. Suppose the
intensity of heat necessarily required for any process to be so great, that the fire made
in a chimney, though confined there, might ignite neighbouring bodies, it might in that
case as well be said, that that was riot a damage by fire, because the original fire was
contained in its proper receptacle. In the common case of a house on fire, if goods
are damaged by the removal, that is a loss by fire within the policy. Put the case of
a chimney on fire, there is only the usual quantity of heat below, but the mischief is
occasioned by an accumulation of soot in the chimney, yet the insurers would be
bound to pay any loss thereby occasioned.
GIBBS C. J. I think it is not necessary to determine any of those extreme
questions. In the present case, I [439] think no loss was sustained by any of the
risks in the policy. The loss was occasioned by the extreme mismanagement by the
Plaintiffs of their register. I so directed the jury, and I have no reason to alter the
opinion I then formed.
DALLAS J. I am of the same opinion. The only cause of the damage appears to
me to have been the unskilful management of the machinery by the Plaintiff's own
servants, and it is therefore not a loss within the meaning of the policy.
Rule refused.
FAITH v. PEARSON. Jan. 25, 1816.
[S. C. 2 Marsh. 439. At Nisi Prius, 4 Camp. 357 ; Holt. N. P. 111.]
No action lies against the commander of a British ship of war for seizing and detaining
a vessel on suspicion of her being hostile prize.-Though he afterwards dismisses
her without libelling her in the Court of Admiralty--And though he detains her
partly on suspicion of matters which are causes only of forfeiture if she is British.
This was an action of trespass for taking the Plaintiff's ship on her voyage from
Senegal to London, and carrying her out of the course of her voyage to Barbadoes,
whereby the Plaintiff was subjected to an action on the covenant contained in his
charter-party, and obliged to pay damages, and sustained various other losses. The
Defendant pleaded in justification that he was commander of a British ship of war,
the Bembow, and that he required the master of the Plaintiff's ship to produce
a manifest of her cargo, but he admitted he had none, wherefore he detained the ship
to be dealt with according to law, until at the master's instance he permitted him to
depart; thirdly, that there was war between Great Britain and America, and that he
boarded the Plaintiff's vessel to enquire whether she belonged to an enemy, and having
reasonable and probable cause to suspect a part of the cargo to be enemy's property,
namely, American, he, in the exercise of his duty, detained and carried the ship into
Barbadoes to be [440] dealt with according to law, until be liberated her at the
master's request. Upon the trial of the cause, at Guildhall, at the sittings after
Michaelmas term 1815, before Gibbs C. J., it appeared that the Defendant, who was
commander of the Bembow, a British ship of war, hailed the Plaintiff's ship the
John, in her course from Senegal to London, and sent an officer on board the
Plaintiff's ship, who, having examined the ship's papers, questioned the master, whether
he was not an American, observing that he and his mate had the appearance of
Americans, that the ship had American canvas and rigging, and appeared to be
American built, which last was not the case, but she being British built, and captured
by the Americans, had been repaired in America, and had on board American canvas
and cordage. He also inquired whether she had not African slaves on board, or had
been concerned in that trade, and on his saying the ship was British, bound from
Senegal to London, he imputed it as an irregularity that she had not on board
a manifest of her cargo from Senegal, as required by the statute 26 G. 3, c. 40.
This, though required by the act, in practice is never given to vessels coming from
the coast of Africa. And the officer caused the Plaintiff's master to go on board the
Defendant's ship with his papers. The master having exhibited to the Defendant
1105
6 TAUNT. 439.
FAITH! V. PEARSON](ViewImageLocal?handle=hein.slavery/ssactsengr0191&div=1&collection=&method=preview&ext=.png&size=3)