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![handle is hein.slavery/ssactsengr0065 and id is 1 raw text is: BATES V. CORT
dants detained these men on board their ships near the coast of England, a writ of
habeas corpus would have set them at liberty. How then can an action be maintained
against these gallant officers for' doing that of their own accord which, by process of
law in a British Court of Justice, they might have been compelled to do? I have
before adverted to the narrower ground upon which this case might have been decided,
but if slavery be recognised by any law prevailing in East Florida, the operation of
that law is local. It i§ an antichristian law, and one which violates the rights of
nature, and therefore ought not to be recognised here. For these reasons I am of
opinion, that our judgment must be for the defendants.
Judgment for the defendants.
[474] BATES against CORT. 1824. Declaration stated, that by agreement between
plaintiff and G. G., plaintiff agreed to sell and deliver to G. G. a lace machine
for 2201.; to be paid thus, 401. on delivery, and the residue by weekly pay-
ments of 11., which were to be paid to defendant, as trustee for the plaintiff,
and in case of any default, plaintiff was to have back the machine; and in con-
sideration of the premises, and of plaintiff, at the request of the defendant,
appointing him to receive the weekly instalments, defendant promised the plaintiff
to take the machine and pay the balance, should there be any default by G. G.
in the weekly payments: Held, that this promise was nudum pactum, and void.
[S. C. 3 D. & R. 676.]
Assumpsit on a special agreement. The first count of the declaration stated,
that by a certain memorandum of agreement made between plaintiff and one G. G.,
the plaintiff agreed to sell and deliver to G. G. a lace machine, then in a working
condition, for 2201., to be paid for as follows : 401. to be paid on delivery, and 11. per
week thereafter until the full amount was discharged, with lawful interest; and it
was thereby mutually agreed that the 11. per week should be paid to the defendant,
who was authorised to receive the same for the plaintiff as his trustee. And in case
of default of G. G. paying the defendant 11. per week, he should forfeit the whole
money which might be then paid, and the machine should be returned to the plaintiff.
And thereupon afterwards, to wit, on, &c., in consideration of the premises, and of
the plaintiff, at the request of the defendant, appointing him to receive the said sum
of 11. per week for the machine from G. G., the defendant undertook, and promised
the plaintiff, to take the machine and pay the balance, should there be any default
by G. G. in the weekly payments to the plaintiff. The declaration then averred
delivery of the machine to G. G. at the price of 2201., payment of 401. at the time ;
but default in the subsequent weekly payments, and that on, &e. 611. became and
still was due for such payments. That plaintiff, on, &c., appointed defendant to
receive the weekly payments, and was always thenceforth willing to suffer him to
receive them; [475] yet defendant, although requested, would not pay plaintiff the
said arrears of 611., or any part. The second count, in like manner, set out the
agreement, the promise of defendant, part performance, and subsequent default by
G. G. ; and then proceeded, Although the plaintiff did, on, &c., appoint defendant to
receive the weekly payments, and hath always been willing to suffer him to receive
them, and to take the said machine to and for his own use and benefit, of which
defendant had notice, yet defendant would not pay the balance'due from G. G. to the
plaintiff. Pleas, first, general issue ; secondly, that the promise in the first count
was to answer for the default of another, and that the only consideration for it, was
the appointment of the defendant to receive the weekly payments, and that there
was no agreement or memorandum thereof in writing signed by defendant, or any
person duly authorised, wherein any other consideration was stated. Thirdly, a
similar plea to the second count. The replication, after protesting that the promise
of defendant, laid in the first count, was not for the default of another, and that the
appointment of defendant was not the only consideration, set out an agreement in
writing between the parties. Similar replication to the third plea. General demurrer
and joinder.
Chitty, in support of the demurrer. The pleas seem to have beer. drawn with a
view to found an objection on the seventeenth section of the Statute of Frauds ; but
the declaration is bad at common law, the promise as laid being void for want of con-
2 33. & C. 474.](ViewImageLocal?handle=hein.slavery/ssactsengr0065&div=1&collection=&method=preview&ext=.png&size=3)