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![handle is hein.slavery/ssactsengr0028 and id is 1 raw text is: HAYCRAFT V. CREASY
it. (Lord Kenyon asked, whether if he had left any personal chattel on the premises,
as a hogshead of wine, he would not have been entitled to it after the term ?) There
[90] is a difference between mere personal chattels, the property of which remains in
the owner till divested by some lawful act of his, and things which are annexed
to the freehold, which, generally speaking, vest in the landlord by act of law. If a
tenant were to leave marble chimney pieces, which he had erected during the term,
he could not come at any time afterwards and take them away. Lord Hardwicke's
opinion is express to that point in Ex pare Quincy (a). So in Fitzherlbert v. Shaw (b),
though it was admitted that the defendant might have removed the erections of this
kind he had made during his tenancy, yet it was ruled that he had no right so to do
after the expiration of the term.
Garrow, contra, was stopped by the Court.
Lord Kenyon C.J. The old cases upon this subject leant to consider as realty
whatever was annexed to the freehold by the occupier: but in modern times the
leaning has always been the other way in favour of the tenant, in support of the
interests of trade which is become the pillar of the State. What tenant will lay out
his money in costly improvements of the land, if he must leave every thing behind
him which can be said to be annexed to it. Shall it be said that the great gardeners
and nurserymen in the neighbourhood of this metropolis, who expend thousands of
pounds in the erection of green-houses and hot-houses, &c. are obliged to leave all
these things upon the premises, when it is notorious that they are even permitted to
remove trees, or such as are likely to become such, by the thousand, in the necessary
course of their trade. If it were otherwise, the very object of their holding would
[91] be defeated. This is a description of property divided from the realty. And
some of the cases have even gone further in favour of the executor of tenant for life
against the remainder-man, between whom the rule has been holden stricter; for it
has been determined that the executor of tenant for life was entitled to take
away the fire engine of a colliery. The case of Fitzherbert v. Shaw turned upon the
construction of an agreement that such things should be left on the premises, and
decided .nothing against the general principle. Here the defendant did no more than
he had a right to do; he was in fact still in possession of the premises at the time
the things were taken away, and therefore there is no pretence to say that he had
abandoned his right to them.
Lawrence J. It is admitted now that the defendant had a right to take these things
away during the term: and all that he admits upon this record against himself, by
suffering judgment to go by default as to the breaking and entering, is that he was a
trespasser in coming upon the land, but not a trespasser de bonis asportatis ; as to so
much, therefore, he is entitled to judgment.
Per Curiam. Let a verdict be entered for the plaintiff as to the trespass in breaking
and entering, damages Is. ; and for the defendant as to the rest of the trespass.
[92] HAYCRAFT against CREASY. Monday, Nov. 23, 1801. Toan inquiry concerning
the credit of another, who was recommended to deal with the plaintiff, a representa-
tion by the defendant that the party might safely be credited, and that he spoke
this from his own knowledge, and not from hearsay, will not sustain an action
on the case for damages on account of a loss sustained by the default of the party,
who turned out to be a person of no credit; if it appear that such representation
were made by the defendant bonA fide, and with a belief of the truth of it; for
the foundation of the action is fraud and deceit in the defendant and damage to
the plaintiff by means thereof. And taking the assertion of knowledge secundum
subjectam materiam, viz. the credit of another, it meant no other than a strong
belief founded on what appeared to the defendant to be reasonable and certain
grounds.
[Applied, Collins v. Evans, 1844, 5 Q. B. 827. Referred to, Wilde v. Gibson, 1848,
1 H. L. C. 630; Leddell v. M'Dougal, 1881, 29 W. R. 405. Applied, Joliffe v. Baker,
1883, 11 Q. B. D. 271. Referred to, Derry v. Peek, 1889, 14 App. Cas. 364.]
In an action on the case for making a false representation of another's credit, the
2 EAST, 90.
(a) I Atk. 477.
(b) 1 H. Blae. 258.](ViewImageLocal?handle=hein.slavery/ssactsengr0028&div=1&collection=&method=preview&ext=.png&size=3)