HeinOnline is a subscription-based resource containing thousands of academic and legal journals from inception; complete coverage of government documents such as U.S. Statutes at Large, U.S. Code, Federal Register, Code of Federal Regulations, U.S. Reports, and much more. Documents are image-based, fully searchable PDFs with the authority of print combined with the accessibility of a user-friendly and powerful database. For more information, request a quote or trial for your organization below.
![handle is hein.slavery/ssactsengr0012 and id is 1 raw text is: tending to be a merchant was holden to be a false token ; and that the authority of
that case had been recognized in another of Rex v. Munoz, H. 13 Geo. 2. So here the
pretending to have money in the hands of Ladbroke and Co. is as much a false token
as the pretending to be a merchant was in Macarty's case; and here is the additional
circumstance of giving the draft upon the bankers in order to fortify the false
pretence. And it has been expressly adjudged (d) that a person taking a draft upon
a banker in lieu of money which he was directed by his correspondent to receive
upon a bill was not guilty of negligence, such being the usual practice among bankers
and traders. If so, it follows of course that the cheat practised by this defendant was
such against which common prudence could not [569] guard. As to the second objec-
tion ; the offence is of a public nature, and therefore falls within another description
of cheats in R. v. Wheatley (a). It is well known that a very considerable share of
the money transactions in the commercial world is carried on by means of the credit
given to drafts upon bankers; and therefore any fraud which tends to impeach such
a security is a matter of public concern, as it must necessarily impede the usual course
of circulation.
Shepherd in support of the rule was stopped by the Court.
Lord Kenyon Ch.J. The case of The King v. Wheatley seems to have clearly
established the true boundary between those frauds that are, and those that are not
indictable at common law. Mr. J. Denison there said there must either be a false
token or a conspiracy. And Mr. J. Wilmot mentioned a case where an indictment
for selling a sack of corn which the defendant falsely affirmed to contain a Winchester
bushel was quashed. Now in this case where is the false token, or what was used by
the defendant to gain credit beyond his own assertion? He sat down and drew a
check on a banker ; but it would be ridiculous to call that a false token ; that left his
credit just where it was before. What the defendant did was immoral aid highly
reprehensible: but as he used no false token to accomplish his deceit, the judgment
must be arrested.
Grose J. The distinction taken by Hawkins is plain; speaking of deceits he says,
(b. 1, c. 71, s. 1,) it is an indictable offence to defraud another of his own right by
means of some artful device; and in sect. 2, That the deceitful receiving of money
from one man to another's use, upon a false pretence of having a message and order
to that purpose, is not punishable by a criminal prosecution, because it is accompanied
with no manner of artful contrivance, but wholly depends on a bare naked lie. In
this case, in order to make it something more than a bare naked lie, it is said that
the defendant used a false token, for that he gave a check on his banker : but that
was only adding another lie. If we were to determine that this was indictable, I do
not know how to draw the line; for it might equally be said that every person who
overdrew his banker used a false token and might be indicted for it.
Lawrence J. It is admitted that a mere false assertion unaccompanied by a
recommendation is not indictable, and I think there is nothing in this case beyond
the defendant's own false assertion. In Nehuff's (b) case, where the defendant [570]
borrowed 6001. of a feme covert, and promised to send her fine cloth and gold dust as
a pledge. and sent no gold dust but some coarse cloth worth little or nothing; the
Court said, It was not a matter criminal, but it was the prosecutor's fault to repose
such a confidence in the defendant.
Rule absolute.
CAMPBELL against JONES. Tuesday, Feb. 9th, 1796. A. in consideration of 2501.
paid by B. and of the further sum of 2501. to be paid, &c. covenanted that he
would with all possible expedition instruct B. in a certain mode of bleaching
linen (for which he had obtained a patent) and B. covenanted that he would on
or before 25th February, 1794, or sooner if A. should before that time have
instructed him, &c. pay the further sum of 2501. ; held that the covenants of A.
and B. were independent covenants; and that A. might sue B. for the 2501.
without averring that he had taught B. the mode of bleaching linen, &c. [Post,
665, 710. 7 T. R. 125. 8 ib. 366.]!
This was an action of covenant, contained in an indenture dated 25th February,
-70,8
CAMPBELL V. JONES
6 T. R. 569.
(d) Russel v. Hankey, ante, 12.
(a) 2 Burr. 1125.
(b) Salk.](ViewImageLocal?handle=hein.slavery/ssactsengr0012&div=1&collection=&method=preview&ext=.png&size=3)