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![handle is hein.slavery/ssactsengr0007 and id is 1 raw text is: ' MEAD V. YOUNG
Conservators of the river Thames: now we are not sufficiently informed by this case
whether they were or were not under any obligation to cleanse and repair the river;
and if they were, this Act was passed in ease of their burden : but whether they were
or not is perfectly immaterial, for they are found in possession of this property which
is rateable, and it is not stated negatively that they are not the beneficial owners of it.
Grose, J. The question before us is not whether or not the City of London be
rated too high 7 but, whether they be properly rated for that which is the subject of
the rate? Now the rate is on the barge-way and toll-gate ; and it appears from the
case, that the soil is in the defendants, and not leased out, as it was in B. v. Jolliffe (a):
the soil, therefore, remaining in them, they are properly assessed for it. Then, is the
City of London rateable in this district 7 It is stated in the case, that 2d. per ton is
due for goods landed at Hampton-Wick ; something, therefore, is rateable to the poor
in this place ; and if we were to determine that the defendants are not liable for that
in Hampton-Wick, we should in effect overturn the case of R. v. Cardington. The
remaining question is, whether the City of London be trustees of this property for the
benefit of the public 7 On this, I confess, I had some doubt at first ; but the manner
in which my brother Buller has put this question, removes all difficulty ; for, finding
the defendants in possession of some property, and that property rateable, they should
have shewn that they were trustees for the public: but not having done so, they must
be rated for it.
Order of sessions confirmed (b).
[28] MEAD against YOUNG. Thursday, Nov. 18th, 1790. In an action by the
indorsee against the acceptor of a bill of exchange, drawn payable to A. or
order, it is competent to the defendant to give evidence that the person who
indorsed to the plaintiff was not the real payee, though he be of the same name,
and though there be no addition to the name of the payee on the bill. If a bill
of exchange, payable to A. or order, get into the hands of another person of the
same name as the payee, and such person, knowing that he was not the real
person in whose favour it was drawn, indorse it, he is guilty of a forgery.
[Referred to, Vagliano v. Bank of Englavd, 1889-1891, 23 Q. B. D. 257
[1891], A. C. 168.]
This was an action brought by the indorsee of a bill of exchange for 901. against
the acceptor. The bill was drawn at Dunkirk by Christian, on the defendant in
London, payable to Henry Davis, or order; and, having been put into the foreign
mail, inclosed in a letter from Christian, it got into the hands of another Henry Davis
than the one in whose favour it was drawn. The defendant accepted the bill ; and
when Davis desired the plaintiff to discount it, the latter made application to the
defendant to know whether or not it was his acceptance ? and, on receiving an answer
in the affirmative, coupled with an assurance that it was a good bill, he discounted it,
not knowing the H. Davis from whom he took it. There was no ground to impute
any fraud to the plaintiff. On the trial before Lord Kenyon, after the plaintiff had
proved the defendant's hand-writing, and the indorsement by Davis, the defendant
offered evidence to shew that the H. Davis, who indorsed to the plaintiff, was not the
real H. Davis in whose favour the bill was drawn : but Lord Kenyon being of opinion
that such evidence was inadmissible, the plaintiff recovered a verdict. A rule
having been obtained to shew cause why a new trial should not be granted on this
misdirection,
Erskine and Shepherd now shewed cause. If there had been any particular
description of the payee on the bill, the plaintiff must have taken care that the person
from whom he received it answered the whole of the description : but there was no
description of, or addition to, the H. Davis; there was nothing on the bill to lead
either the acceptor or any third person to suspect that the H. Davis, who was in
possession of the bill, was not the real payee. And, so far from the plaintiff's having
incurred any charge of neglect, he seems to have taken more than ordinary caution
(a) Ante, 2 vol. 90.
(b) Vide R. v. F. Page, post, 543, and B. v. The Commissioners of Salter's Lead Sluice,
post, 730, post, 8, 340.
T. . 28.](ViewImageLocal?handle=hein.slavery/ssactsengr0007&div=1&collection=&method=preview&ext=.png&size=3)