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![handle is hein.sag/sagnc0035 and id is 1 raw text is: [342] January 14, 1998
Mr. William R. Gilkeson
Staff Attorney, N.C. General Assembly
Suite 545, LOB
Raleigh, NC 27603-5925
Re: Advisory opinion; Definition of city and county employee as including elected officials; political
activities of local government elected officials and employees; N.C.G.S. §1 53A-99; N.C.G.S.
§160A-169.
Dear Mr. Gilkeson:
The following is in response to the request for an opinion set out in your correspondence dated
October 21, 1997 asking whether the term employee as defined in N.C.G.S.§§ 153A-99 and
160A-169 extends to elected officials of cities and counties. Both statutes are identical save for
the use of county in one and city in the other, and this opinion is applicable to both statutes.
The term [e]mployee is defined in subdivision (b)(1) of N.C.G.S.§ 153A-99 and in N.C.G.S. §
160A-169 to mean any person employed by a county [city] or any department or program thereof
that is supported, in whole or in part, by county [city]funds. While the definition does not directly
address the point raised by your inquiry, it does support a broad application of the term
employee.
Your request for an opinion recognizes that in certain situations the terms officers and
employeesare intended to be mutually exclusive, whereas in other situations the term
employees is intended to include all individuals employed in any status and would include
officers. Although an office is an employment, it does not follow that every employment is an
office. McQuillin, The Law of Municipal Corporations, Vol. 3, § 12.30. See also, State v. Hord,
264 N.C. 149; 141 S.E.2d. 241 (1965). The context of a statute will dictate the interpretation to be
given to the words used in the statute. Morecock v. Hood, 202 N.C. 321, 323, 162 S.E.2d 730,
731 (1932); 73 Am. Jur. 2d Statutes § 213 (1974).
There has been only one case that has addressed the issue raised by your request. In Carter v.
Good et al., 951 F.Supp. 1235 (WDNC, 1996) the plaintiff alleged he was wrongfully dismissed
from his position as a deputy sheriff by the defendant sheriff because of his support of the
opponent of the defendant during an election campaign. The opinion rejected the defendant
sheriffs argument that he was not a county employee and that N.C.G.S. § 153A-99 was not
applicable to the constitutionally created, elected office of sheriff. 951 F. Supp. at 1248, 1249.
We have found no North Carolina state court cases interpreting N.C.G.S. § 153A-99 or N.C.G.S.
§ 160A-169. However, two North Carolina cases with regard to disclosure of personnel files,
which interpreted the word employee in N.C.G.S. § 153A-98 to apply to the appointed office of
county manager and the elected office of sheriff, provide insight into the issue under
consideration.
In Elkin Tribune, Inc. v. Yadkin County Bd. of Commissioners, 331 N.C. 735, 417 S.E.2d. 465
(1992), the question before the Court was the availability to the public of the names and
applications of people applying for the position of county manager under the provisions of
N.C.G.S. § 153A-98, which refers only to employees and does not use the term officer. The
Court held that N.C.G.S. § 153A-98 was applicable to the applications for the office of county
manager, even though the position of county manager clearly falls within the definition of the term
officer. N.C.G.S. § 153A-82.](ViewImageLocal?handle=hein.sag/sagnc0035&div=1&collection=&method=preview&ext=.png&size=3)