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The Honorable David Johnson Office of the Attorney General
May 1, 2017
Office of the Attorney General
State of Iowa
*1
Opinion No. 17-4-1
*1 May 1, 2017
*1 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; STATE OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES: United States Const., art. II, § 1, clause 6; Iowa Const. art. 1, § 2, art. Ill
§ 1, Art. IV §§ 1, 2, 3, 6, 10, 14, 15, 17, 18, 19; Iowa Code §§ 4.4(2), 69.8(2). Under Iowa Constitution Article IV, section 17, upon resignation
of the sitting governor, the duties of the governor devolve to the lieutenant governor, who becomes governor and has the title of governor.
When the office of governor devolves to the lieutenant governor, the lieutenant governor holds the offices of both governor and lieutenant
governor, there is created no vacancy in the office of lieutenant governor, and therefore no power to appoint a lieutenant governor to fill a
vacancy in that office. Interpreting otherwise would frustrate the provisions in Iowa Const. Article IV providing gubernatorial succession
beyond the office of lieutenant governor, and the framers' intention to have the chief executive selected by an election of the people, not by
an appointment. (Thompson to Johnson, State Senator, 5-1-17)
*1 The Honorable David Johnson
*1 State Senator
*1 PO Box 279
*1 Ocheyedan, Iowa 51354
Dear Senator Johnson:
*1 Thank you for your letter of February 1, 2017. Your letter references Governor Terry Branstad's recent nomination to serve as United
States Ambassador to China and poses nine specific questions about the effect of his potential resignation as Governor of Iowa. We agree
that your letter raises important legal questions about Iowa's constitutional framework for the succession of executive power. This office has
not previously addressed these questions directly, nor has the Iowa Supreme Court. Thus, we believe they are appropriately addressed in an
official opinion of the Attorney General under Iowa Code section 13.2(e).
*1 We share your belief that these important issues require a thoughtful and detailed analysis. Taken as a whole, the nine questions you
pose implicate two central constitutional questions. Those two important questions of law are:
*1 First question: If the governor resigns, does the lieutenant governor become governor?
*1 Second question: If the lieutenant governor becomes governor, may she then appoint a new lieutenant governor?
*1 The answers to these questions must flow from a careful consideration of the succession framework set forth in the words and structure of
the Iowa constitution. See Rudd v Ray, 248 N.W.2d 125, 129 (Iowa 1976) (The framers of our constitution necessarily gave us their ideas in
the words they agreed upon.). The debates of the 1857 constitutional convention also shed important light on the meaning and intent of the
constitutional provisions establishing that framework. See N. W Halsey & Co v. City of Belle Plaine, 104 N.W. 494, 496 (Iowa 1905) (noting
that reading the constitutional debates may aid in a fuller understanding of constitutional provisions). Finally, our answers can and should be
informed by interpretations of the same or similar provisions in other states' constitutions. See Van Horn v. City of Des Moines, 191 N.W.
144, 148 (Iowa 1922) (considering similar provisions in the Constitution[s] of other states to decide an issue of first impression).
I. Background
*2 We first provide context for the legal questions by identifying the relevant constitutional provisions, examining portions of the 1857
constitutional convention, and noting historical practice both in Iowa and on the federal level.
*2 A. Constitutional Provisions. Article IV of the Iowa Constitution establishes the executive branch and sets forth a framework for the
succession of executive power. Some provisions of article IV have been amended since 1857, but we initially focus on the original provisions
because those established the original framework. In doing so, we consider all the original executive branch provisions without placing
undue significance on one section. See Rolfe State Bank v. Gunderson, 794 N.W.2d 561, 565 (Iowa 2011) ([W]e avoid placing undue
importance on isolated portions of an enactment by construing all parts of the enactment together.). We also remain mindful not to render
any provision meaningless or redundant. See Iowa Code § 4.4(2) (2017) (presuming every piece of language is intended to be effective);
Mall Real Estate, L.L.C. v. City of Hamburg, 818 N.W.2d 190, 198 (Iowa 2012) (We ... interpret statutes in such a way that portions of it do
not become redundant or irrelevant.); see also Junkins v. Branstad, 448 N.W.2d 480, 483 (Iowa 1989) (Constitutional provisions are
generally subject to the same rules of construction as statutes.).
*2 Considering article IV as a whole promotes a holistic understanding of the constitutional framework, because each provision can inform
the others. See Iowa Code § 4.1(38) (Words and phrases shall be construed according to the context ....); see also Allen v. Clayton, 18
N.W. 663, 667 (Iowa 1884) (noting that to determine the meaning of a constitutional provision, the sections preceding and following it, which
have reference to the same subject-matter, must be read and considered); State exrel. Martin v. Heil, 7 N.W.2d 375, 381 (Wis. 1942) ([Tlhe](ViewImageLocal?handle=hein.sag/sagia2017&div=1&collection=&method=preview&ext=.png&size=3)