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24 U.C. Davis Bus. L.J. 1 (2023-2024)

handle is hein.journals/ucdbulj24 and id is 1 raw text is: PARTY AUTONOMY LIMITATIONS IN SOVEREIGN LOAN
CONTRACTS?
ILIAS BANTEKAS*
ABSTRACT
It is argued that contracts entered into between sovereign states and the
International Monetary Fund (IMF), or international development banks, do not
satisfy party autonomy requirements that are otherwise expected in ordinary
contracts. Sovereign loan agreements exhibit elements of compulsion, chiefly
because of the imminent default, or actual default, of the borrowing state. This
ultimately allows lenders and other states in alliance with lenders to impose
conditions that are knowingly unconstitutional and injurious to the civil, political
and socio-economic rights of the borrower's population. National courts should,
at the very least, view the compulsory contracts in the same manner as ordinary
contracts and assimilate the distressed sovereign to a distressed private party
entering into a contract with a financial institution that is clearly the stronger of
the two parties.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
ABSTRACT                .......................................... .....................1
I. INTRODUCTION....................................           .....................2
II. THE WORLD BANK GROUP                        ..............................................4
III. SOVEREIGN ACCESS TO PRIVATE FINANCING.       ............... ...............7
IV. INDEBTEDNESS AND DEBT RELIEF MECHANISMS ...........................8
V. HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES: THE IMPORTANCE OF LINKAGES        ......................9
VI. CONFLICTS OF INTEREST                     ...............................................11
VII. How CONDITIONALITIES UNDERMINE FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN RIGHTS .........13
VIII. CONTRACTUALIZATION OF CONDITIONALITIES ..........................14
IX. THE HUMAN RIGHTS IMPACT OF THE PRIVATE SECTOR IN THE
INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL ARCHITECTURE          ............................16
X. IFIS AND ODIOUS/UNSUSTAINABLE DEBT          ................ .................18
XI. LIMITATIONS TO PARTY AUTONOMY IN INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTS BY
REFERENCE TO JUSTICE                     .............................................20
* Professor of Transnational Law, Hamad bin Khalifa University (Qatar Foundation) College
of Law; Adjunct Professor of Law, Georgetown University, Edmund A Walsh School of
Foreign Service and Senior Fellow, Institute of Advanced Legal Studies of the University of
London

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