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9 Regul. Rev. Depth 1 (2020)

handle is hein.journals/rgyrvidh9 and id is 1 raw text is: 













          THE   SUPREME COURT'S DOUBLETHINK ON
              ARBITRATION AND ADMINISTRATION

                          Paul  R. Verkuilt

    1984 was  a dramatic  year for literature and law. George Orwell's
classic novel came   of age, with its four Ministries of Peace,  Love,
Plenty, and Truth that brilliantly described their opposites.1 Less observed
that year-except   by administrative  lawyers-was the U.S. Supreme
Court's decision in Chevron  v. Natural Resources Defense  Council, the
case that was to recalibrate judicial review of agency decisions.2 Also
decided that same year was Southland Corp. v. Keating, a case preempting
state arbitration laws  that even  administrative  lawyers  may   have
ignored.3
    It is tempting to tie all three events together-since Orwell's ministries
are, after all, agencies. But I will focus on the two decisions by  the
Supreme  Court. Taken together, they tell an unappreciated tale of doctrinal
contradiction-a kind of Orwellian doublethink.
    The question for today is how did arbitration, an alternative decision
regime  about which  the Court knows   little, become so favored that a
majority of justices have been willing to embrace it almost without question,
while administration, an established regime about which the Court knows a
lot, has been questioned to the point of being disfavored?4
    Chevron  is the well-known tale, as the most cited administrative law
case and the subject of endless discussion that has felled many trees.5 I
intend to leave most of that aside and focus on Chevron's overarching purpose:

    T President emeritus of the College of William and Mary. From 2010-2015 he served
as the Chairman of the Administrative Conference of the United States. The author wishes
to thank Kevin Bell, Cary Coglianese, Jeff Lubbers, Dick Pierce, Imre Szalai, Matt Wiener,
and the editors of The Regulatory Review.
    1 GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 (1949).
    2 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
    3 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
    4 See Jonathan H. Adler, Shunting Aside Chevron Deference, REGUL. REV. (Aug. 7,
2018), https://www.theregreview.org/2018/08/07/adler-shunting-aside-chevron-deference/.
    5 See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of
Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511 (1989); Adrian Vermeule, Chevron as a Legal Framework,
ADMIN. L. JOTWELL   (OCT. 24, 2017), https://adlaw.jotwell.com/chevron-as-a-legal-
framework.

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