![handle is hein.journals/respub6 and id is 1 raw text is: JUSTIN CRUICKSHANK
ETHNOCENTRISM, SOCIAL CONTRACT LIBERALISM AND
POSITIVISTIC-CONSERVATISM: RORTY'S THREE THESES
ON POLITICS
ABSTRACT. In this article I argue that Rorty has three separate arguments for liberal-
ism. The pragmatic-ethnocentric argument for liberalism, as a system which works for
'us liberals', is rejected for entailing relativism. The social contract argument results in an
extreme form of individualism. This renders politics redundant because there is no need for
the (liberal) state to protect poetic individuals, who are capable of defending themselves.
Even if the less able are harmed, the state could not prevent this, given Rorty's arguments
about discursive enrichment within a language game. Finally, the positivistic-conservative
argument legitimises liberal politics by fiat, and makes normative discussion about the
status quo illegitimate. Here the argument is that politics is a matter of reactive technical
piecemeal problem-solving, to restore the harmony of the status quo. As politics deals with
'facts', normative 'problematisations' of the functional status quo are illegitimate (in the
public/political sphere). So, either anything goes, and politics is redundant, or discussion of
politics is depoliticised and confined to the private sphere. Consequently, Rorty has no way
to explore issues of power, or normative contestation. Therefore he is unable to address
issues of social justice within liberal democracies, such as feminist arguments about an
ascribed gender status limiting equality of opportunity.
KEY WORDS: equality of opportunity, gender, liberalism, pragmatic-ethnocentric
argument, Rorty, social contract argument
INTRODUCTION: POLITICS AND PHILOSOPHY
Rawls' A Theory Of Justice changed the conceptual landscape of con-
temporary political philosophy;2 but according to Rorty,3 Rawls has been
misread. The significance of Rawls' work, on the usual reading, lies in
its advocacy of deontological liberalism, which ran counter to the then
1 I am grateful for the feedback I received from those who attended the 1998
Critical Realism Conference at the University of Essex (After Postmodernism: Critical
Realism?), 1-3 September, where a short draft of this paper was presented. I should also
like to thank Res Publica's anonymous referees for their helpful comments.
2 J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971).
3 R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism and Truth: Philosophical Papers vol. 1 (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, [1991] 1994), 175-96.
r Res Publica 6: 1-23, 2000.
© 2000 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.](ViewImageLocal?handle=hein.journals/respub6&div=1&collection=&method=preview&ext=.png&size=3)
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