About | HeinOnline Law Journal Library | HeinOnline Law Journal Library | HeinOnline

33 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 1 (2005)

handle is hein.journals/philadp33 and id is 1 raw text is: 










DAVID   SUSSMAN                  What's Wrong with Torture?











Why   is torture morally  wrong?  This  question  has  been  neglected  or
avoided  by  recent moral  philosophy,  in part because   torture is by its
nature especially difficult to discuss. Torture involves degrees of pain and
fear that are often said to be utterly indescribable; indeed, these experi-
ences  are sometimes   said to destroy  in their victims the very hope  of
any  sort of communication or shared experience whatsoever.1 Torture
has proved  surprisingly difficult to define.2 There is no clear agreement
on  the  distinction between   torture, coercion,  and  manipulation,   or
whether  such  techniques  as sleep and sensory  deprivation, isolation, or
prolonged  questioning  should  count as forms of torture.3 In addition, we
may   be fearful of deriving  some  sort of perverse  titillation from the
subject, or of being able to dispassionately  contemplate  the agonies  of
real victims of torture. Those who have not suffered torture may  well feel


   Earlier versions of this article were presented at the University of Toronto, the Univer-
sity Center for Ethics and the Professions, Harvard University, and the Philamore Ethics
group. I am grateful to Kate Abramson, Arthur Applbaum, Marcia Baron, Elizabeth
Harman, Simon Keller, Christine Korsgaard, Rahul Kumar, Margaret Little, Dick Moran,
Henry Richardson, Arthur Ripstein and Dennis Thompson for helpful comments and sug-
gestions. I am also grateful for fellowship support from the University Center for Ethics and
the Professions, Harvard University, during the preparation of this article.
   1. See, e.g., Jean Amery, Torture in Art From the Ashes, ed. Lawrence L. Langer (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 130-31; Diana Kordon et al., Torture in Argentina
in Torture and its Consequences, ed. Metin Basoglu (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1992), pp. 443-44; Elaine Scarry, The Body in Pain (New York: Oxford University Press,
1985), pp. 34-38.
   2. See Edward Peters, Torture (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1985), p. 154.
   3. Donald Rumsfeld insists that what the prisoners at Abu Ghraib suffered was not
technically torture but only abuse, and the European Court of Human Rights has con-
cluded that while Great Britain had subjected suspected IRA sympathizers to inhuman
and degrading treatment, what they suffered was nevertheless not quite torture. In
neither case, however, was it made clear just what the relevant distinction was supposed
to be (see n.15 below).

   © 2005 by Blackwell Publishing, Inc. Philosophy & Public Affairs 33, no. 1

What Is HeinOnline?

HeinOnline is a subscription-based resource containing thousands of academic and legal journals from inception; complete coverage of government documents such as U.S. Statutes at Large, U.S. Code, Federal Register, Code of Federal Regulations, U.S. Reports, and much more. Documents are image-based, fully searchable PDFs with the authority of print combined with the accessibility of a user-friendly and powerful database. For more information, request a quote or trial for your organization below.



Short-term subscription options include 24 hours, 48 hours, or 1 week to HeinOnline.

Contact us for annual subscription options:

Already a HeinOnline Subscriber?

profiles profiles most