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3 Pa. L. Rec. 1 (1880)

handle is hein.journals/pennlord3 and id is 1 raw text is: Entered at the Post-Office at Philadelphia as second-class matter.
THE ONLY COMPLETE AND CORRECT TRANSFER RECORD PUBLISHED IN PHILADELPHIA.

VOL. Ill.

PHILADELPHIA, PA., JUNE 8, 1880.

TABLE OF CONTENTS.
PAGE.
Supreme Court Decision:
St. Patrick's Beneficial Society v. McVey.  1
Transfer Record..... .....................................  I
M ortgages......................................................  3
Assignment of Mortgages................... .............  3
Judgm ents...........................  ...........................  4
Proceedings  in  Orphan 9'  u rt.......................  5
w ills................................................................  6
Adm inistrations  ..............................................  . .
Building  Permits........  ................................  6
Business Changes...........................................  6
Advertisem ents..............................................  7-8
SIp     io  C1out of Pennsliania1
ST. PATRICK'S BENEFICIAL SOCIETY v.
McVEY.
Rights and liabilities of beneficial societies. A by-law
regulating the amount to be paid weekly to the sick,
being merely a rule for the governmentof the officers
in the administration of the society's benefaction-. s
mist necessarily be subject to amendment and altera-
tion to suit the fund set apart for that purpose.
Error to the Court of Common Pleas No.
4 of Philadelphia county.
This action was brought by Rody McVey
against the St. Patrick's Male Beneficial So-
ciety of Philadelphia, to recover sick benefits.
Tne facts were as follows:
The St. Patrick's Male Beneficial Society
of Philadelphia, plaintiff in error, was incor-
porated May 5, 1866, and is governed by a
constitution and by-laws.
At a regular monthly meeting in Septem-
ber, 1876, the society, finding that their funds
had become almost exhausted-that another
month (in the words of the secretary) would
clean them out entirely-proposed the fol
lowing by-law:  Be it resolved, that we
suspend the weekly payments of benefits to
the sick members until there is eight hundred
dollars in the treasury. The resolution was
laid over (under the rules) for one month,
and duly passed at the meeting in Octo-
ber, 1876.
At the time of the adoption of this by-law,
McVey, defendant in error, was a member,
and had been prior thereto. He became
sick, January, 1877, and so continued until
March 17, 1877.
No notice of this sickness was given to the
secretary until about four months after his
recovery, at which time he was six months in
arrears. He then paid the arrearages and de-
manded his sick benefits, which the society
refused to pay-because the funds in the
treasury did not amount to the sum required
by the by-law passed October, 1876. Suit
was brought by him before a magistrate, who
gave judgment against him, fion which
judgment this action was an appeal.
The court below (Elcock, J.) charged the
jury as follows:  This action is brought by
the plaintiff to recover sick benefits from the
defendants, who are a beneficial society.
There is no dispute about the fact that he
was sick during the time that he claims, to

wit, from January 20, 1877, to March 17,
1877. The defendants contend that the
plaintiff is not entitled to recover, for two
reasons: []st. That there was no notice
served upon the secretary in accordance with
the rules and regulations of the society. This
was not of substance in this case. The want
of notice here was not one of the substantive
requisites for recovery. The want of notice
at the time is no substantive reason for not
paying the plaintiff He would be entitled
to recover, because the rule in relation to no-
tice was intended to prevent fraud on the so-
ciety. Here there is no fraud alleged, but
there is no denial of the sickness. 2d. They
relied upon a resolution or by-law passed
October 2, 1876, by which the society re-
solved not to pay any sick benefits until there
should be accumulated the sum of eight hun-
dred dollars. This, gentlemen, is a confes-
sion of insolvency, and the society should
have wound up its affairs and gone into liqui-
dation; but they had no right to pass that
resolution. It it opposed to the very object
for which the society was formed and is un-
lawful. They cannot pay one class and not
another. They must, if they cannot do
better than this society did by this resolution,
surrender their franchises or make an assess-
ment on their members to raise funds. Coun-
sel for defendants have submitted to me the
following point to charge you on: 'If the
jury believe that the resolution of October 2,
1876, was regularly passed by the society de;
fendants, the plaintiff, being a member is
bound thereby and cannot recover.' I refuse
to so charge you, gentlemen, as the point is
given]. '
Verdict for plaintiff, and judgment. De-
fendant took this writ, assighing for error the
portion of the charge of the court included in
brackets.
Opinion by GORDON, J. February 9th 1880.
Upon an examination of the charter of
the society above named, we find, under
article second, the following: The object of
this society is beneficial, and the accumula-
tion of a fund for the mutual aid and relief of
those who may become members of it and
require its beneficence in sickness or neces-
sity.
Here two important particulars, funda-
mental in their character, become obvious:
(1) The society is a charity, designed pri
marily for the relief of such of its necessitous
members as may require, thst is, need its
beneficence. (2). In order that it may be
enabled to carry out this scheme of benevo-
lence a fund must be accumulated from the
contributions of the membership. Without
this it could give nothing, could afford no
pecuniary relief, for it would have nothing.
What the amount of that fund was to be,
under $2500, was left discretionary with the
society, as will appear from Article 16;
nevertheless a fixed amount was contem-
plated. This was wise, for if the money re-
ceiv, d from monthly dues was to be ex-
pended just as it was received, the operations

of the society must necessarily be fitful and
uncertain. One month the sick might be re-
lieved, the dead buried, and the next it might
be impossible to do either for want of means.
Hence the efficiency and harmonious work-
ing of the society depended largely upon the
existence of a permanent fund. It follows
that the by-law, regulating the amount to be
paid weekly to the sick, was but a rule for the
government of the officers in the administra-
tion of the society's benefactions, and must
necessarily be subject to amendment and
alteration to suit the fund set apart for that
purpose. Hence arises the error of the court
below in treating the case, (1) as though the
organization was a quass insurance company;
and (2) as though the by-law in existence
when the plaintiff became a member was part
of a contract unalterable except with his con-
sent.
This error becomes more obvious upon ref-
erence to Article 9th of the charter, which
provides that the stewards, finding the appli-
cant for sick benefit  worthy, shall obtain
and pay to him such weekly sum as the ex-
isting by-law may direct.
From this it is manifest that the plaintiff
ought not to have been allowed to recover
under a by-law which had been repealed be-
fore he fell sick.
But more than this: to treat the proposed
benefaction of this association as a matter of
right, was a mistake. When McVey entered
the society it promised him nothing of the
kind; it promised him pecuniary aid )n his
sickness or necessity only in case it had funds
for that purpose, and then, under the condi-
tion that its officers, after notice, found him
to be a person worthy of such aid. For the
court to say, therefore, that the plaintiff was
entitled as of right to the sum of five dollars,
or any other sum of money, per week, whilst
he lay sick, and to treat the society as his
debtor to that amount, was to introduce into
its organic law a novelty found neither in its
letter nor spirit.
From any and every point of view pre-
sented by this case, the defendant was en-
titled to a verdict, and so the jury ought to
have been instructed.
The judgment is reversed.
William Gorman, Esq., for plaintiff in
error.
OFFICIAL RECORD OF PROPERTY
TRANSFERS
IN THE CITY OF PHILADELPHIA FOR THE
WEEK ENDING SATURDAY, JUNE 5, 1880.
The Columbia B and L Asb'n to
Abraham Detwiler E s Gratz
270 ft N Oxford Also E s Gritz
30 ft N Oxford .........     $1,200 00
Henry T Coleman to Jonathan
Evans E s 12th and S W s
Ridge av irreg shape Also Es
12th 17 61 ft N Buttonwood
iregshape...........................  45,000  00

No. 4.

11

IV

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