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5 J. Int'l Disp. Settlement 1 (2014)

handle is hein.journals/jloildte5 and id is 1 raw text is: 



Journal of International Dispute Settlement, 2014, 5, 1-4                      a
doi: 10.1093/jnlids/idt029
Advance Access Publication Date: 17 January 2014



EDITORIAL



Investment Arbitrators' Evident Lack of

                                 Restraint


Investment  treaty arbitration has emerged as a prosperous forum in which a small group
of legal professionals-at its core, a few dozen individuals-has immense power  to de-
cide what legislatures, governments and courts can do, and at what cost to the public,
without  conventional safeguards of judicial independence and procedural fairness. The
author's new  book, a chapter  of which is reproduced  in this volume  of the Journal,
focuses on the arbitrators as agents of their fate, alongside that of states and investors,
and  especially on whether they showed   restraint in ways often used by domestic  or
international courts.
   Commentators have proposed different forms of restraint   in investor-state arbitra-
tors. For example, Burke-White  and  von Staden suggested  a general margin of appre-
ciation for states; Stone Sweet argued for general limitations on investor protection
and  lauded  the 'grand  entrance' of proportionality in Continental  Casualty; Schill
called for deference based on  a comparative  analysis of domestic public law; Moloo
and Jacinto  advised that deference should be  limited to the treaty language and, by
implication, to ring-fenced restraint within particular treaty standards.1 These ideas
are not exhaustive  or mutually exclusive; each may  have merit and  should be  given
attention.
   Yet  any proposal for restraint faces a challenge in light of the present record of
arbitrator performance.  After a comprehensive   search of the  arbitrators' reasoning
for language that could signal restraint, it was clear that the arbitrators, with few ex-
ceptions, rarely signalled restraint in any of a variety of ways. In the first place, this
contradicted  claims  that investment  treaty arbitration is, or is becoming,   more

1   W Burke-White and A von Staden, 'The Need for Public Law Standards of Review in Investor-State
    Arbitrations' in SW Schill (ed), International Investment Law and Comparative Public Law (OUP 2010)
    715-19; A Stone Sweet, 'Investor-State Arbitration: Proportionality's New Frontier' (2010) 4 L & Ethics
    of Human Rights 47, 73-6; SW Schill, 'Deference in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Re-conceptualizing
    the Standard of Review' (2012) 3 JIDS 577; R Moloo and J Jacinto, 'Reviewing Standards and Standards
    of Review: Domestic Public Interest Regulation in International Economic Law' in KP Sauvant (ed), Year-
    book on International Investment Law & Policy 2011-2012 (OUP 2013) 550-62.

© The Author 2014. Published by Oxford University Press.                         .  1
All rights reserved. For permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oup.com

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