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6 J. Conflict Resol. 1 (1962)

handle is hein.journals/jcfltr6 and id is 1 raw text is: Game theory and models of negotiation HAROLD W. KUHN Departments of Economics and Mathematics, Princeton University On October 7, 1961 a conference de- voted to the Applications of Game Theory to Negotiation was held at Princeton Uni- versity under the auspices of the Institute for Defense Analyses and with the support of the Carnegie Corporation. In addition to open discussion' of the problems of for- mulating a mathematical model of negotia- tion, the meeting considered summaries of three papers prepared by Fred C. Ikl6, John C. Harsanyi, and Dean G. Pruitt. Revised versions of these papers are included in this special issue of the Journal of Conflict Res- olution. It is the main purpose of this editorial note to explain the context in which they arose. As such, it also provides the issue editor with a forum in which he may set forth the views of a mathematician on the potential applications of game the- ory to international negotiation. When game theory and game theorists have entered the domain of the social sci- ences they have been subjected to a variety of attacks. However diverse the source of these attacks, they seem to dwell on two main themes. The first of these is typified by Schelling when he writes that game 'The following scientists contributed to the conference: Robert J. Aumann, Lawrence Fouraker, Fred Ikl6, John C. Harsanyi, Harold W. Kuhn, R. Duncan Luce, Koichi Miyasawa, Oskar Morgenstern, Dean Pruitt, Howard Raiffa, Robert Reichardt, Reinhard Selten, L. S. Shapley. theory may have missed its most promising field by being pitched at too abstract a level (Schelling, 1960, p. 119). Here, and elsewhere, he has argued that game theory has overshot the level at which the most fruitful work may be done by abstracting away such essential ingredients as systems of communication and enforcement. A sec- ond main line of criticism is represented by Maccoby when he asserts that although the game theorist will argue that his method demands isolating some variables and pretending for the sake of clarity that others remain more or less constant, he does not always appreciate the power of his hid- den variables. In particular, the full social and psychological consequences . . . have not been sufficiently studied (Maccoby, 1961, p. 280). It is not the purpose of this article to contest either of these points of view, since there is considerable justice in both of them. Rather our aim is to point to directions in which the theory may develop so as to answer them. Since some of the criticism of game the- ory as applied to the behavioral sciences seems to stem from a misunderstanding of what the theory of games comprises, it may be useful to start from a definition which was framed on another occasion (Kuhn and Tucker): The Theory of Games is a branch of mathe- matics that aims to analyse various problems of

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