![handle is hein.journals/jcfltr41 and id is 1 raw text is:
Using Game Theory to Link
Domestic and International Politics
ROBERT PAHRE
Department of Political Science
University of Michigan
PAUL A. PAPAYOANOU
Department of Political Science
University of California, San Diego
How do the links between domestic politics and the international system affect the
way that states interact in the global arena? Scholars are giving this question greater
attention today than they have in the past. One reason is that many see the end of the
cold war as having made domestic politics more important in foreign policy matters.
Similarly, the increasing importance of economic affairs in international relations has
made domestic interest groups and coalitions more salient.
Theoretical developments in the field of international relations also point toward a
greater need to study the links between domestic politics and foreign affairs. For
several decades, many in the field organized their arguments around particular levels
of analysis or made claims about the primacy of one level over another (Singer 1961;
Waltz [1954] 1959, 1979). Although the distinction has helped scholars make signifi-
cant contributions to our understanding of international politics, many now feel a
theoretical synthesis of variables from the international system and domestic politics
is necessary.
Some scholars who argue for a move past the levels-of-analysis distinction take
issue with the positivist epistemology underlying most work in international relations.
In particular, constructivists argue that looking at how states and systems mutually
constitute each other can increase our understanding of world politics (Ashley 1984;
Cox 1981; Wendt 1992). Others maintain that a positivist synthesis is possible, under
the rubric of two-level games or a similar metaphor (Evans, Jacobson, and Putnam
1993; Mastanduno, Lake, and Ikenberry 1989; Putnam 1988). The contributors to this
special issue agree with the latter position; we need not toss out the positivist baby
with the levels-of-analysis bathwater.
This issue explores the role that game theory can play in transcending the levels-
of-analysis distinction and debate. The contributors show that game-theoretic tools
can help scholars think rigorously about the simultaneous or interactive effects of
AUTHORS' NOTE: We thank David Lake, Barry O'Neill, and Duncan Snidal for comments on various
drafts, as well as the participants in the New Games conferences for helping to shape the project.
JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION, Vol. 41 No. 1, February 1997 4-11
D 1997 Sage Publications, Inc.
4
from the SAGE Social Science Collections. All Rights Reserved.](ViewImageLocal?handle=hein.journals/jcfltr41&div=1&collection=&method=preview&ext=.png&size=3)
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