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93 Minn. L. Rev. Headnotes 1 (2009)

handle is hein.journals/headnotpan93 and id is 1 raw text is: Response Article A Better Solution to Moral Hazard in Employment Arbitration: It Is Time to Ban Predispute Binding Arbitration Clauses Lisa Blomgren Binghamt and David Henning Good* Mandatory arbitration is a neologism that describes the capacity of an economically stronger repeat player to impose an adhesive binding arbitration clause on the weaker, usually one- shot, player. Such agreements appear frequently as a condition of some economic relationship, most problematically employ- ment, consumer purchases, or health care.' Employers and businesses adopt adhesive arbitration clauses as a means to manage the risk of litigation and perceived runaway jury awards.2 Professor Michael LeRoy, together with his colleague Professor Peter Feuille, has made a series of important empiri- cal and substantive contributions to the dialogue and contro- versy.3 In his recent article appearing in the Minnesota Law t Keller-Runden Professor of Public Service, Indiana University School of Public and Environmental Affairs, Bloomington, Indiana. t Associate Professor of Public and Environmental Affairs and Director of the Transportation Research Center, Indiana University School of Public and Environmental Affairs, Bloomington, Indiana. Copyright © 2009 by Lisa Blomgren Bingham and David Henning Good. 1. For reviews of the literature, see Michael H. LeRoy, Do Courts Create Moral Hazard?: When Judges Nullify Employer Liability in Arbitrations, 93 MINN. L. REV. 998, 1001 n.13 (2009). 2. Lisa B. Bingham, Control Over Dispute-System Design and Mandatory Commercial Arbitration, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter/Spring 2004, at 221, 221-23 (arguing that repeat players that control the design of arbitration systems manage risk by shifting transaction costs to the one-shot player to re- duce the settlement value of a case and discourage litigation). 3. Michael H. LeRoy, Getting Nothing for Something. Vhen Women Pre- vail in Employment Arbitration Awards, 16 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 573, 573- 81 (2005); Michael H. LeRoy, Jury Revival or Jury Reviled? When Employees Are Compelled to Waive Jury Trials, 7 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 767, 767-72 (2005); Michael H. LeRoy, Misguided Fairness? Regulating Arbitration by Sta- tute: Empirical Evidence of Declining Award Finality, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV.

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