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14 Feminist L. Stud. 1 (2006)

handle is hein.journals/femlst14 and id is 1 raw text is: Feminist Legal Studies (2006) 14:1-26 © Springer 2006 DOI 10.1007/s10691-006-9012-3 THERESE MURPHY and NOEL WHITTY THE QUESTION OF EVIL AND FEMINIST LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP ABSTRACT. In this article, we argue that feminist legal scholars should engage directly and explicitly with the question of evil. Part I summarises key facts sur- rounding the prosecution and life-long imprisonment of Myra Hindley, one of a tiny number of women involved in multiple killings of children in recent British history. Part II reviews a range of commentaries on Hindley, noting in particular the repeated use of two narratives: the first of these insists that Hindley is an icon of female evil; the second, less popular one, seeks to position her as a victim. In Part III, the article broadens out and we explain why we think feminist legal scholars should look at the question of evil. In large part, the emphasis is on anticipating the range of possible objections to this argument, and on trying to answer these objections by showing how a focus on evil might benefit feminist legal thinking - specifically in relation to the categories of perpetrator and victim and, more generally, in relation to laws motivated by a desire to secure women's human rights. KEY WORDS: agency, evil, feminist legal scholarship, victims, women who kill In this article, we argue that feminist legal scholars should engage directly and explicitly with the question of evil. This is a difficult and risk-laden argument, and we are uncertain how it will be received. It may be seen as apposite, in particular because of the marked increased in the use of the language of evil in political rhetoric and also perhaps because of the surge of interest in evil in other academic disciplines. On the other hand, however, there is a risk that the argument will be dismissed as reckless, or even as indecent (on the assumption that evil is something one should not attempt to explain). Less dramatically, there is a risk that it will be deemed low status; as something that has no claim to priority attention from feminist legal scholars. In light of these concerns, this article focuses on why feminist legal scholars should examine the question of evil. In other words, it does not sketch a proposal for a feminist legal account of evil: its aim, instead, is to argue for a particular orientation. The structure of the article is as follows. In Parts I and II, we try to provide a context for the overall argument. Part I summarises key

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