About | HeinOnline Law Journal Library | HeinOnline Law Journal Library | HeinOnline
LOG IN
LOG IN

44 Fed. L. Rev. 1 (2016)

handle is hein.journals/fedlr44 and id is 1 raw text is: FEDERALISM AND SUBSIDIARITY: PRINCIPLES AND PROCESSES IN THE REFORM OF THE AUSTRALIAN FEDERATION Nicholas Aroney* ABSTRACT The principle of subsidiarity offers a criterion for the rational allocation of roles within federations between federal and state governments. The principle states that 'functions should be performed by the lowest level of government competent to do so effectively'. However, embedded in the principle is a hierarchy: there are 'higher' and there are 'lower' levels of government. This hierarchy suggests a point of view from which assessments of optimal allocation are to be made. The deeper question, therefore, is this: 'who will decide for whom?' The reform of a federal system turns not only on what principles are used, but on questions of process: who will decide what those principles require, and how will they go about doing it? A problem of path dependency lies at the heart of Australia's federal malaise. It is this problem that we need to be grappling with when considering the optimal design of the system. To do so, we need to consider not only the principles but also the processes by which the federal system is to be reformed. This paper draws on the comparative experience of Switzerland, Germany and Austria to provide guidance about how Australia's federal system might best be reformed. If we want to know how to change institutions, we must be attuned to the fact that there is frequently a mismatch between the initial aims of institution-builders and the contemporary value we attach to them.1 I INTRODUCTION For some time now, the principle of subsidiarity has figured prominently in academic and official discussion of the reform of federal systems. The principle is conspicuous, for example, in the Terms of Reference and Issues Papers published by the Australian Professor of Constitutional Law and Australian Research Council Future Fellow, School of Law, University of Queensland. This paper was presented at the Australian Attorney- General's Department Constitutional Law Symposium, Canberra, 1 May 2015. Note, since the writing of this article, the Federation White Paper process has been discontinued by the federal government. The support of ARC grant FT100100469 is gratefully acknowledged. Daniel Ziblatt, Structuring the State: The Formation of Italy, Germany, and the Puzzle of Federalism (Princeton University Press, 2006) xi.

What Is HeinOnline?

HeinOnline is a subscription-based resource containing thousands of academic and legal journals from inception; complete coverage of government documents such as U.S. Statutes at Large, U.S. Code, Federal Register, Code of Federal Regulations, U.S. Reports, and much more. Documents are image-based, fully searchable PDFs with the authority of print combined with the accessibility of a user-friendly and powerful database. For more information, request a quote or trial for your organization below.



Short-term subscription options include 24 hours, 48 hours, or 1 week to HeinOnline.

Purchase Access

Contact us for annual subscription options:

Contact Us

Already a HeinOnline Subscriber?

Log In

profiles profiles most