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51 Eur. J.L. & Econ. 1 (2021)

handle is hein.journals/eurjlwec51 and id is 1 raw text is: European Journal of Law and Economics (2021) 51:1-30
https://doi.org/1 0.1007/s10657-020-09680-4
Related party transactions, agency problem, and exclusive
effects
Kyoung-Soo Yoon - Yangsoo Jin2
Accepted: 20 December 2020 / Published online: 2 January 2021
© The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Science+Business Media, LLC part of Springer Nature 2021
Abstract
This paper examines the incentives for, and economic impact of related-party trans-
actions (RPTs) by controlling shareholders (CSHs) of corporate groups. We ana-
lyze a theory model of RPTs transacted on 'market terms' by two affiliate firms in
a group, one of which belongs to an upstream and the other to a downstream mar-
ket. We show that RPTs of this kind, although non-advantageous to the CSH of the
group in terms of transfer price, may be abusive in that they serve the interests of
the CSH by sacrificing minority shareholders. This is due to the exclusive effects of
such RPTs. We show that a CSH has a strong incentive to exclude upstream rivals
for his/her own sake rather than the group's when he/she is allowed to implement
such RPTs. The results shed light on regulation of RPTs: distortions of RPTs arise
not only from unfair transfer-pricing but also from large transaction volume. This
further implies that competition policies regarding the leverage of market power and
anti-competitive vertical mergers may be applied to regulate harmful RPTs.
Keywords Related party transactions - Agency problem - Tunneling - Corporate
group - Exclusion
JEL Classification K2 - L4 - L5
E Yangsoo Jin
ysjin @ sungshin.ac.kr
Kyoung-Soo Yoon
yoonks @gachon.ac.kr
Department of Economics, Gachon University, 1342 Seongnamdaero, Sujeong-gu,
Gyeonggi-do 13120, Republic of Korea
2 Department of Economics, Sungshin University, 2 Bomun-ro 34da-gil, Seongbuk-gu,
Seoul 02844, Republic of Korea

I_) Springer

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