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4 Const. Pol. Econ. 1 (1993)

handle is hein.journals/constpe4 and id is 1 raw text is: CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY, VOL. 4. NO. 1, 1993 HOW CAN CONSTITUTIONS BE DESIGNED SO THAT POLITICIANS WHO SEEK TO SERVE PUBLIC INTEREST CAN SURVIVE AND PROSPER?* James M. Buchanan** Distributional politics in modern democracy involves the exploitation of minorities by majorities. and as persons rotate membership, all parties in the game lose. This result emerges only because differences in treatment are permissible. If the principle of generality (analogous to that present in an idealized version of the rule of law) could, somehow, be introduced into politics, mutual exploitation could be avoided. The analysis offers support for such policies as (I) flat-rate taxes, (2) equal per head transfers or demogrants and (3) uniform regulation of all industries. In a short paper, Public Choice after Socialism (1992), I argued that the structure of modern democratic politics is such that the play- ers, the participants in the distributional game among competing con- stituency agents, are effectively forced to behave as if they are exclu- sively motivated by narrowly defined or differential special interests. Political players who might seek to further some conception of an all- encompassing general, or public, interest cannot survive. They tend to be eliminated from the political game in the evolution-like selection process. In this note, I want to extend this argument further by asking the question: How could the structure (constitution) of modern politics be changed so that it would allow players who might try to further a more encompassing interest to survive and prosper? Or, in other terms, how could the constitutional framework be reformed so that players who advance generalized interests are rewarded rather than punished. As indicated in the other paper, the response is clear. The distributional elements in the inclusive political game must be eliminated, or at least very substantially reduced. But I want here, to the extent possible, to *The argument here was initially presented as a Liberty Fund Conference talk in July 1992 under the title Political Ethics as a Criterion for Constitutional Design. I am indebted to my colleagues Viktor Vanberg, and especially Hartmut Kliemt for helpful comments on an earlier draft. **Advisory General Director and Harris Professor, George Mason University, Fairfax, VA 22030. 1

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